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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER JAMES HOWELL, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
BARBARA JOYCE HOWELL, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
) BRIEF OF 
) District 
) Civil No. 
1 Priority 
RESPONDENT 
Ct. No. D87-4343 
890596-CA 
Class. 14b 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to consider this appeal is vested in the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to R. Utah Ct. App. 3 and 4 and Utah 
Code §78-2a-3(2)(h)(1989). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a Decree of Divorce executed by the 
Honorable Frank G. Noel, Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on May 12, 1989. Husband filed a motion 
to amend the judgment or for relief from the judgment which was 
denied by the trial court on August 31, 1989. Wife appeals those 
provisions of the Decree of Divorce awarding alimony in the sum 
of $1, 800. 00 per month. She requests that this court vacate and 
remand the order dividing the net equity from the sale of the 
California residence with instructions that the trial court 
consider as an expense of sale potential capital gains tax 
consequences. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. The trial court appropriately determined that the 
parties standard of living should be based upon plaintiff7 s 
earnings for those years immediately prior to and at the time of 
the parties7 separation in 1986. 
II. The trial court awarded alimony within the bounds and 
standards of its discretion which requires affirmation of its 
decision. 
III. The trial court properly refused to consider 
theoretical capital gains tax consequences on the sale of the 
California property. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The following provisions from the Utah Code are relevant to 
this case: 
30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and 
health care parties and children - Court to have 
continuing jurisdiction - Custody and visitation-
Termination of alimony - Nonmeritorious petition for 
modification. (1) When a decree of divorce is 
rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property, and parties. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
Trial in this matter was held before the Honorable Frank G. 
Noel, Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, on Thursday, December 22, 1988. The court heard and 
considered the testimony and exhibits of the parties. (Husband 
at T. 28-61, 89-165; Wife at T. 70-80, 206-241). The court also 
heard and considered testimony from a consulting actuary 
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regarding the value and distribution of husband7 s retirement 
benefits (T. 4-27); a rehabitation, vocational and 30b placement 
specialist regarding wife's vocational aptitude and 30b placement 
opportunities (T. 62-70, 80-86); and a certified public 
accountant and financial planner regarding income and tax matters 
relating to the payment of alimony and child support (T. 165-183, 
199, 202-204) and the tax consequences of a sale of the 
California home (T. 183-202). 
The court took the matter under advisement and on January 
19, 1989, rendered its decision (T. 244-254). The trial court 
awarded wife alimony in the sum of $1,800. 00 per month and child 
support in the sum of $1,363. 00; ordered husband to provide 
health, dental and life insurance until the children attained the 
age of 21 years and to pay one-half of all extraordinary expenses 
not covered by insurance; ordered husband to provide health 
insurance for the benefit of his wife and equally divided the 
substantial real and personal property acquired by the parties 
over the course of their marriage (T 244-254). 
The parties were married in Cushmg, Oklahoma, on October 
14, 1956 (T. 31, R. 264). Five children were born as issue of the 
marriage (T. 31), but at the time of trial, only one child, age 
16, remained in the home (T. 31, R. 264). 
The parties began experiencing dissatisfaction with each 
other and m 1981, husband filed for dissolution of the marriage 
(T. 41). The parties attempted reconciliation (T. 42), but 
divorce suits were again filed by husband in 1984 (T. 41) m 1986 
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(T. 41) and in 1987 (R. 2). Except for a brief weekend together 
in 1988 (T. 32, 44), the parties last resided together on 
November 22, 1986 (T. 42). Wife retained counsel in 1987 (T.241) 
and began receiving alimony payments that same year (T. 46). 
Husband began his pilot training prior to the marriage 
(T. 33) and began working for Western Airlines on October 30, 1957 
(T. 38). Husband's income increased over the years, except 
between 1981 and 1986, when his income remained level due to 
Western Airlines7 financial difficulties (T. 40-41). The parties 
also ran a business during this period of time (R. 217). 
At the time of the parties' final separation in 1986, 
husband earned between $5, 500. 00 and $5, 600. 00 per month, and had 
been earning this sum for the last five years of the parties' 
marriage (T. 245-246). Husband paid temporary alimony to wife 
during the years 1987 and 1988 (T. 46). At the time of trial on 
December 22, 1988, husband earned $10, 120. 00 per month (T. 45, 
132). The trial court determined that the income level of 
$5, 500. 00 per month reflected the living standard of the parties 
during the last five years of their marriage (R. 265); however, 
in setting alimony, the trial court determined husband' s level of 
earning ability based upon his present income of $10, 000. 00 per 
month (R. 2 65). 
Wife in this case had taken approximately 30 hours of 
college courses in junior college and had also attended the 
University of Florida (T. 70-71). Throughout the marriage, wife 
was a homemaker and worked at various part-time jobs: as a piano 
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instructor (T. 72, 210), child care attendant, (T. 73), secretary 
(T. 74, 76), salesperson (T. 74-75, 210), switchboard operator 
(T. 75, 210), and bookkeeper (T. 76). Wife testified that she had 
not been able to secure full-time employment because she was 
unable to find work that would permit her to remain in the home 
with her sixteen-year-old son (R. 228-229). 
An expert witness in rehabilitation, vocational evaluation 
and job placement testified that, based upon wife's testimony, 
she had available to her employment opportunities in the field of 
child care, teacher' s aide, secretarial or clerical, and retail 
sales (T. 62, 80-85). The expert witness testified that in her 
opinion, wife was capable of earning between $7,200.00 and 
$16,800.00 per year (T.82-85). The trial court found that wife 
earned, or is capable of earning, $7,500. 00 per year or $625. 00 
per month (R. 265). The trial court ordered husband to pay wife 
alimony in the sum of $1,800.00 per month (R. 278) and child 
support in the sum of $1,363.00 per month (R. 278). 
The parties resided in a home in Camarillo, California until 
1984 when they also purchased a home in Utah (R. 266). At the 
time of trial, the home in California was leased to third-parties 
until September, 1989 (T. 227). At trial, husband testified that 
he desired that the California home be sold and the parties 
divide equally the proceeds (T. 58), for the reason that the sale 
would permit each party to purchase their own residences and take 
advantage of federal tax credits (T. 103, 156-157), and because 
the upkeep on the California home was too expensive (T. 157). 
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Wife testified that she desired to be awarded the California home 
because it was the family home (T. 214, 223) and she believed the 
Utah home to be valued at $140,000.00 (T. 218). The trial court 
ordered that both homes be sold and that the net proceeds of each 
sale be divided equally between the parties (R. 280, 281). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The alimony award should be affirmed on the grounds that the 
trial court resolved that issue well within the bounds of its 
discretion after considering the financial condition and needs of 
the wife, her ability to provide sufficient income for herself 
and husband's ability to provide support. The tax issue raised 
in appellant' s brief was not presented to the trial court and, 
consequently, should not be considered upon appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY DETERMINED THAT THE 
PARTIES' STANDARD OF LIVING SHOULD BE BASED UPON 
HUSBAND' S EARNINGS FOR THOSE YEARS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO 
AND AT THE TIME OF SEPARATION IN 198 6. 
Wife seeks alimony based upon husband' s earnings in 1988, 
instead of the standard of living shared by the parties during 
the time that they lived together between 1981 and 1986 
(Appellant's Brief at 13). The principle thrust of appellant's 
argument is that the parties agreed to accept reduced income 
between 1981 and 1986, based upon a promise by Western Airlines 
that husband's income would substantially increase upon the 
completion of a Delta Airlines takeover (Appellant' s Brief at 
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13; (T. 216-217). However, no evidence was offered at trial to 
support wife's allegations that the parties had agreed in 1981 to 
a delayed compensation arrangement with husband' s employer. 
Husband testified that his income remained level between 
1981 and 1986 because Western Airlines was attempting to remain a 
viable company (T. 40-41). His pay was never reduced, he just 
received no increase (T. 114-115). Neither husband nor wife 
testified that in 1981 they anticipated a merger between Western 
Airlines and Delta Airlines which would result in substantial 
benefits to them. Wife introduced no evidence in support of her 
assertion because none exists. 
Furthermore, wife did not reconcile the inconsistency in her 
claim that the parties made a conscious decision to delay present 
benefits in 1981 with the fact that the two were apparently not 
getting along during this period of time and had separated on 
numerous occasions The parties began experiencing 
dissatisfaction with their marriage in 1981, and husband filed 
for dissolution of the marriage (T. 41). An attempt was made to 
reconcile their differences, but divorce suits were again filed 
by husband in 1984 (T. 41), m 1986 (T 42) and in 1987 (R. 2). 
Except for a brief weekend together in 1988 (T 32, 44), the 
parties last resided together on November 22, 1986 (T. 42) Wife 
retained counsel in 1987 (T. 241) and pursuant to court order 
began receiving alimony payments that same year (T. 46). In 
short, the parties' knowledge of a final "pay off" following the 
"lean years" when husband earned over $5,000.00 per month comes 
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now i n r e t r o s p e c t . 
At t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t r i a l i n t h i s m a t t e r , t h e t r i a l c o u r t 
awarded w i f e a l imony i n t h e sum of $ 1 , 8 0 0 . 0 0 p e r month (R. 278) . 
The t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s i n s u p p o r t of i t s j udgmen t were as 
f o l l o w s : 
5. At t h e t i m e of t h e s e p a r a t i o n of t h e 
p a r t i e s , t h e p l a i n t i f f was e a r n i n g be tween 
$5, 500. 00 p e r month and $5, 600. 00 p e r month 
and had been e a r n i n g t h i s sum f o r f i v e y e a r s 
p r i o r t o t h i s t i m e . A f t e r s e p a r a t i o n , t h e 
p l a i n t i f f f i l e d an a c t i o n f o r d i v o r c e which 
he d i s m i s s e d a t t r i a l ; t h a t a f t e r a t w o - d a y 
a t t e m p t e d r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , he f i l e d t h i s 
a c t i o n . 
6. The c o u r t b e l i e v e s t h e income l e v e l of 
$ 5 , 500. 00 r e f l e c t s t h e i n c o m e l e v e l and 
l i v i n g s t a n d a r d s of t h e p a r t i e s d u r i n g t h e 
l a s t f i v e y e a r s of t h e i r l i v e s t o g e t h e r . 
7. The p l a i n t i f f e a r n s , from h i s p r e s e n t 
e m p l o y m e n t , a s a l a r y of $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 p e r 
month. The c o u r t has d e t e r m i n e d i n s e t t i n g 
a l i m o n y t h a t w h i l e $ 5 , 500 . 00 p e r m o n t h 
r e p r e s e n t s t h e l i v i n g s t a n d a r d s of t h e 
p a r t i e s m t h e l a s t f i v e y e a r s of t h e 
m a r r i a g e , when t h e p a r t i e s r e s i d e d t o g e t h e r , 
t h e a b i l i t y of t h e p l a i n t i f f t o pay a l i m o n y 
i s b a s e d u p o n h i s p r e s e n t i n c o m e o f 
$ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 p e r month. 
(R. 265) . 
The standard of review by this court of the decision of the 
trial court is succinctly stated in Bridenbaugh v Bridenbaugh, 
786 P. 2d 241 (Utah App 1990) 
T r i a l c o u r t s h a v e c o n s i d e r a b l e 
d i s c r e t i o n i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e amount of 
a l imony a p p r o p r i a t e i n a g i v e n c a s e , and w i l l 
be u p h e l d u n l e s s a c l e a r and p r e j u d i c i a l 
abuse of d i s c r e t i o n i s shown. 
B r i d e n b a u g h , 786 P. 2d a t 242 ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) . 
Wife argues that the trial court misapplied the law in that 
the court failed to consider the standard of living the parties 
would have enjoyed "had the marriage continued" as mandated by 
Savage v. Savage, 658 P. 2d 1201 (Utah 1983) (Appellant's Brief at 
15). First, wife misreads Savage. In Savage, the Utah Supreme 
Court affirmed the trial court's alimony and child support award 
on the grounds that the amounts awarded by the trial court were 
consistent with the parties' past standard of living and the 
benefits they had previously enjoyed during the marriage. 
Savage, 658 P. 2d at 1205. The language cited by wife, in this 
case, imposing upon the trial court an obligation to consider the 
standard of living "had the marriage continued" is dictum and 
must not form the basis of reversal of the trial court' s decision 
in this case. 
Second, if this court were to impose upon trial courts an 
obligation to set the standard of living at a level 
proportionate to that which the parties would have enjoyed "had 
the marriage continued, " this would necessarily require the trial 
court to speculate about a host of possible increases or 
decreases in wealth that could befall a family within its 
lifetime and would create an impossible task for the trial court 
in attempting to establish a baseline for future modification 
purposes. 
Third, the logical extension of wife' s interpretation of 
Savage would result in periodic and automatic increases or 
decreases in alimony. Such interpretation is inconsistent with 
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Utah statutory provisions which empower the trial court with 
continuing jurisdiction to impose such orders as are equitable in 
relation to the parties. See Utah Code §30-3-5 (1989). 
Fourth, the "fundamental purpose of alimony ' is to enable 
the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the 
spouse from becoming a public charge. ' " Bndenbaugh, 786 P. 2d at 
242 (quoting Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P. 2d at 100). Future events 
or changes in income should not be used to retroactiveLy adjust 
application of this standard as articulated by this court and the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
Finally, wife argues that had the trial court set the 
standard of living of the parties at the time of trial in 1988, 
the trial court would have acted consistently with the 
requirement that marital assets are valued as of the time of 
trial (Appellant's Brief at 15-16). However, the issue is the 
standard for setting alimony, not division of property In any 
event, while wife has correctly stated the general rule, this 
court has declared that, under appropriate circumstances, assets 
may be valued at an earlier date. See, e. g. , Anderson v. 
Anderson, 757 P. 2d 476, 479 (Utah App. 1988); Peck v. Peck, 738 
P,2d 1050 (Utah App. 1987) 
The trial court has wide discretion in distributing the 
income and properties of the parties in an equitable fashion and 
is not required to operate within a rigid compartment of time. 
Cf. Canning v. Canning, 744 P. 2d 325, 327-329 (Utah App. 1987) 
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(The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the allocation of assets and 
liabilities of the parties which took into account the on-again 
off-again relationship of the parties in fashioning relief); see 
also Samipinos v. Sampinos 750 P. 2d 615, 618 (Utah App. 1988) 
(Trial court has broad discretion in the division of property 
regardless of the source or time of acquisition). 
In this case, the trial court determined that: 
With regard to alimony, the court has attempted to 
apply the law of the State of Utah, and that is to 
equalize the standard of living of the parties, and to 
maintain that standard at a level at which it existed 
during the marriage. The court is of the opinion that 
that level of standard of living experienced by the 
parties during their marriage, is best represented by 
the standard of living that they enjoyed at the time of 
the separation of the parties during the 1986 period of 
time. 
(T. 245-246). Wife has not demonstrated that the trial court's 
order misapplied the law or abused its discretion. Consequently, 
the decision of the trial court must be affirmed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT AWARDED ALIMONY WITHIN THE BOUNDS 
AND STANDARDS OF ITS DISCRETION. 
The trial court is accorded broad discretion in awarding 
alimony. Davis v. Davis, 749 P. 2d 647, 649 (Utah 1988). Its 
decision will not be disturbed provided that the trial court 
considered: 
(1) the financial condition and needs of the 
party seeking alimony; (2) that party's 
ability to produce a sufficient income for 
him-or herself; and (3) the ability of the 
other party to provide support. Failure to 
analyze the parties7 circumstances in the 
light of these three factors constitutes an 
abuse of discretion. As long at the "trial 
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court exercises its discretion within the 
bounds and under that standards we have set 
and has supported its decision with adequate 
findings and conclusions, we will not disturb 
its rulings." 
Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P. 2d 1144, 1147 (Utah App. 1988) 
(citations omitted). 
Wife argues on appeal that the trial court failed to 
consider her needs, her inability to meet those needs and her 
husband' s ability to pay substantial sums of alimony (Appellant' s 
Brief at 8). 
The first factor to be considered is wife's financial 
condition and needs. The trial court awarded wife a portion of 
husband' s retirement benefits with Western Airlines and Delta 
(R. 279); a portion of husband's military retirement benefits 
(R. 279); an IRA account in the amount of $10,397.00 (R. 279); one-
half of the substantial net proceeds from the sale of real 
properties located in California, Utah and Texas (R. 280-282); her 
bank accounts (R. 282); substantial personal property (R. 282-283) 
and $7,500.00 in attorney's fees (R. 284). In addition, she was 
awarded child support in the sum of $1,363.00 per month (R. 278); 
assistance with the children' s medical, dental, orthodontic and 
eye care expenses (R. 279-280) and assistance with her own health 
expenses (R. 280). Finally, husband was ordered to maintain life 
insurance for the benefit of the children until they obtain the 
age of 21 years or marry (R. 280). 
Wife testified at the time of trial in December, 1988, that 
her monthly living expenses totaled $5,021.00 (T.233), although 
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her financial declaration filed with the court in September, 
1988, listed monthly expenses of only $4,464.62 (R. 122). Wife's 
expenses included numerous debts which she incurred subsequent to 
the parties' separation to various credit card and department 
store accounts (T. 236); banks (T. 234); third-parties (T. 235); and 
also included her assumption that she would continue to incur 
monthly mortgage expenses of $1, 500. 00 per month from the real 
property located in Utah (T. 229), unless she moved into the more 
expensive California home (T. 229). Wife submitted no evidence of 
her anticipated expenses in the event that she moved to 
Cali f ornia. 
The trial court ordered the sale of the homes in California 
and Utah (R. 280-281), thereby necessarily eliminating many of 
the monthly expenses forming the basis of wife' s request for 
$4, 000. 00 in alimony. 
The second factor to be considered is wife' s ability to 
produce a sufficient income for herself. Wife testified that the 
reason that she could not secure full-time employment was because 
she felt that she needed to be at home with her sixteen-year-old 
son (R. 228-229). Throughout the marriage, wife worked at 
various part-time jobs: as a piano instructor (T. 72, 210), child 
care attendant (T. 73), secretary (T. 74,76), salesperson (T. 74-75, 
210), switchboard operator (T. 75, 210) and bookkeeper (T. 76). 
She had taken approximately 30 hours of college courses in junior 
college and had also attended the University of Florida (T. 70-
71). 
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An expert witness in rehabilitation, vocational education 
and job placement testified that based upon wife's testimony, 
wife had available to her employment positions in the field of 
child care, teacher' s aide, secretarial or clerical, or retail 
(T. 62, 80-85). The expert witness testified that, in her 
opinion, wife was capable of earning between $7,200.00 and 
$16,800.00 per year (T. 82-85). The trial court found that wife 
earned, or is capable of earning, $7, 500. 00 per year or $625. 00 
per month. (R. 265). 
The third factor that must be considered by the trial court 
is the ability of the other party to provide support. The 
alimony award in this case was based upon husband' s income at the 
time of trial (R. 265). 
Husband testified at trial that he believed that wife was 
not entitled to alimony for the reason that the parties had 
accumulated substantial assets that would generate adequate 
income to meet wife' s monthly expenses (T. 116). Husband 
supported his argument with his trial brief which relied upon 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P. 2d 304 (Utah 1988) for the 
proposition that an award of sufficient income-producing 
property, or property capable of producing income, should be 
considered in eliminating or reducing the need for alimony (R. 
175-178). His position is also supported by Noble v. Noble, 761 
P. 2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988) where the Utah Supreme Court held 
that issues of alimony and property division are not entirely 
separable and the trial court may consider the property division 
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as well as the relative earning capabilities of the parties. 
Husband's proposition was rejected by the trial court as 
well as wife' s request that she be awarded alimony in the sum of 
$3,500.00 per month (T. 212). Instead, the trial court awarded 
wife $1,800.00 per month alimony, which when combined with 
husband' s child support obligation, is approximately one-third of 
husband' s present salary, leaving one-third for husband and one-
third for the Internal Revenue Service and State Tax Commission. 
Wife has made no showing sufficient to rebut the presumption 
that the trial court consider the parties' financial condition 
and needs, expenses and income. She has merely disagreed with 
the court's conclusion. Accordingly, the decision of the trial 
court must be affirmed. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO CONSIDER 
THEORETICAL TAX CONSEQUENCES FROM THE SALE OF 
THE CALIFORNIA HOME. 
Wife' s final claim of error is that the trial court abused 
its discretion by failing to consider, as an expense of sale, the 
capital gains tax consequences on the sale of the California home 
prior to equal distribution of the property (Appellant' s Brief at 
1, 16). At trial, the parties discussed the issue of capital 
gains treatment on the sale of the California home, but wife's 
position was that she should be awarded the California home in 
which to live (T. 214) and that the home should not be sold 
(T. 215-216). At no time did wife request that the trial court 
consider the tax consequences as an expense of sale, or in the 
alternative, adjust the division of the net equity to compensate 
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wife for her alleged disparate ability to pay (T. at 183-186, 
196, 197, 200-202), even though the trial court inquired of 
counsel after having rendered its judgment from the bench whether 
any matters where overlooked (T. 251). Having failed to raise 
this issue at trial, wife is precluded from raising this issue on 
appeal. Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P. 2d 96, 99 (Utah 1986). 
Even if wife's objection to the sale of the California 
property could be construed as a request that husband pay all or 
a substantial portion of any capital gain consequences from the 
sale, wife is not entitled to the relief she now seeks on the 
grounds that the trial court properly refused to speculate about 
the hypothetical tax consequences resulting from the sale of the 
California property. See Alexander v. Alexander, 737 P. 2d 221, 
224 (Utah 1987) (Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to adjust the market value of a retirement account in 
anticipation of future tax liability). 
The value of the California property, for the purpose of 
determining the ultimate tax liability of the parties, was not 
determinable at trial because the property was leased to third-
parties and was unavailable for sale until October, 1989, almost 
one year later (T. 212). Wife's expert witness testified that he 
estimated the present value of any tax liability to be 
$23, 400. 00, which sum was based upon a hypothetical profit of 
$260,000.00 (T. 201). Also assumed in the hypothetical profit 
figure was the time of sale and percentage of discount rate 
(T. 202). The amount of capital gains tax liability was made more 
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uncertain by the fact that the parties may be able defer all of 
part of the gain by investing the proceeds from the sale of the 
California property into new residences. Int. Rev. Code §1034. 
Wife's expert witness testified that it would be possible, 
although difficult, that the parties could qualify for exclusion 
under section 1034 and section 121 of the Internal Revenue Code 
(T. 185, 196-197, 198-199). 
Finally, wife argues that the trial court' s distribution is 
rendered inequitable because her share of the equity in the 
California property will be diminished by her potential capital 
gains tax liability (Appellant's Brief at 21). This argument 
carries with it an assumption that the State of Utah requires and 
equal, not equitable, distribution of marital assets. However, 
Utah "law contemplates a fair and equitable, not an equal 
division" of the marital debts and assets. Sinclair v. Sinclair, 
718 P. 2d 396, 398 (Utah 1986); see also Newmever v. Newmever, 745 
P. 2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1987). 
The trial court, in its broad discretion, has awarded wife 
approximately one-half of the marital assets and support income 
and insurance benefits in excess of $3, 100. 00 per month. It is 
fair and equitable that if any capital gain tax liability is 
imposed, that each party bear their own expense. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court resolved the alimony issue well within the 
limits of its discretion. All areas of mandated inquiry were 
reviewed and appropriate findings were made. The alimony award 
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should be affirmed and the tax issue, having never been presented 
to the trial court, should be rejected. If the tax issue is 
considered, the trial court appropriately resolved it. The trial 
court should be affirmed and husband should be awarded the costs 
and attorney fees incurred in defending this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS J.— DAY OF -MARSR, 1990. 
David S. Dolowitz 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this j£ — day of 
t^fi-fe-eh, 1990, a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Brief was 
caused to be mailed, first class, postage fully prepaid, in the 
United States mail, to the following: 
Paul H. Liapis 
Helen E. Christian 
Kim M. Luhn 
GUSTIN, GREEN, STEGALL & LIAPIS 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
Third Floor, New York Building 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
(j ean\mj d\howeI i br f) 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * • • * 
WALTER JAMES HOWELL, ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
v. ) 
BARBARA JOYCE HOWELL, ) Civil No. D87-4343 
) Judge Frank Noel 
Defendant. ) 
* * * * * 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for 
trial on Thursday, the 22nd day of December, 1988, the 
Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding. The plaintiff was present 
in person and represented by counsel, David S. Dolowitz and 
John Mason, The defendant was present in person and 
represented by counsel, Paul H. Liapis. The court heard and 
considered the testimony of the parties, received exhibits 
into evidence and determined to take the matter under 
advisement- Thereafter, being advised in the premises, the 
court announced its decision in open court on the 19th day of 
January, 1989. The plaintiff then submitted proposed Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree to the court, 
provisions to which defendant objected. Those objections were 
heard and resolved before the court on April 27, 1989. 
Accordingly, the court now makes and enters the following as 
its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The defendant was a resident of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, when this action was filed and had been so for 
more than three months immediately prior thereto. 
2* The parties are husband and wife, having been 
married on October 14, 1956, in Cushing, Oklahoma. 
3. Irreconcilable differences arose between the 
parties which they attempted to reconcile, but were unable to 
do so. 
4. There were five (5) children born as issue of this 
marriage; four (4) are emancipated. Both of the parties 
agreed that care, custody and control of the one (1) remaining 
minor child of the parties, Sean Daniel Howell, born August 
21, 1972, age 16, should be awarded to the defendant, subject 
to reasonable rights of visitation in the plaintiff. The 
defendant is a fit and proper parent to be awarded the care, 
custody and control of the minor child of the parties. 
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5. At the time of the separation of the parties, the 
plaintiff was earning between $5,500.00 per month and 
$5, 600. 00 per month and had been earning this sum for five 
years prior to this time. After separation, the plaintiff 
filed an action for divorce which he dismissed at trial; that 
after a two-day attempted reconciliation, he filed this 
action. 
6. The court believes the income level of $5,500.00 
reflects the income level and living standards of the parties 
during the last five years of their lives together. 
7. The plaintiff earns, from his present employment, 
a salary of $10,000. 00 per month. The court has determined in 
setting alimony that while $5,500. 00 per month represents the 
living standards of the parties in the last 5 years of the 
marriage, when the parties resided together, the ability of 
the plaintiff to pay alimony is based upon his present income 
of $10,000.00 per month. 
8. The defendant earns, or is capable of earning, 
$7, 500. 00 per year, or $625. 00 per month. At the time of 
trial, defendant was employed with Casual Furniture on a part-
time basis earning a gross income of $649. 80 per month, 
although that employment was scheduled to end on December 31, 
1988 and she had not yet secured replacement employment. 
9. Application of the Child Support Guidelines 
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adopted by the courts of the State of Utah would require the 
payment of child support from the plaintiff to the defendant 
in the sum of $1,363.00 per month based upon plaintiff's 
income of $10,000.00 per month until Sean attains the age of 
18 and graduates from high school with his regularly-scheduled 
graduating class. 
10. The plaintiff filed separate tax returns in 1986 
and 1987 and the defendant has not filed tax returns for those 
years. 
11. The parties acquired, during the course of their 
marriage, a home and real property located in California, to-
wit: 1767 Calle Rocas, Camarillo, California, which was the 
primary residence of the parties prior to their move to Utah 
in 1984; a home and real property located in Utah, to-wit: 
8241 Top of the World Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah; seven (7) 
lots in the state of Texas; interests in a series of pension 
plans maintained by the employer of the plaintiff, to-wit: 
Western Airlines and Delta Airlines, (these plans are the 
Western Airlines Plan A, the Western Airlines Plan B, the 
Western Airlines Plan D, the Delta Plan and the Delta Savings 
Plan); and an interest in a military retirement plan, part of 
which was earned prior to the marriage; three IRA accounts, 
one in the name of the plaintiff for $7, 546. 57, a second in 
the name of the plaintiff in the sum of $4,196.43 and one in 
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the name of the defendant for $10, 397. 00; bank accounts at 
Western Federal Credit Union, Ranier Bank, Valley Bank, Mt. 
West Savings, and Camarillo Community Bank; 8. 6023 shares of 
Delta stock; stock in Continental Power Co. ; furniture, 
fixtures, furnishings and appliances; five guns; an IBM 
computer and software; a 1977 Buick automobile; a 1987 Ford 
truck and camper; a 1980 Datsun 280Z; a 1978 ski boat; a 1982 
fold boat and motor; several pieces of ivory; and a 35mm 
camera. 
12. The plaintiff testified that the precise term of 
the military retirement plan is being re-examined by the 
United States Navy, as plaintiff was in the Naval Reserve 
prior to going on active duty and this period of time should 
have been included in the plan calculations but had not, as 
of the date of trial, and this determination had been appealed 
and was being reviewed by the Navy. 
13. After separation of the parties, the plaintiff 
withdrew $33,000.00 from a retirement fund which was expended 
to pay for marital debts of the parties, to-wit: $16,000.00 
to repay a loan $3,400.00 on the VISA account; $12,500.00 to 
pay income taxes; $1,000.00 on their daughter's wedding; and 
$600.00 to refinance the parties' home. 
14. The parties acquired various debts which remain 
unpaid, to-wit: 
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Tracy Collins Bank 
Camarillo Community Bank 
Defendant's Personal Loan (attorney's fees) 
Camarillo Bank VISA 
Nordstroms 
Weinstocks 
ZCMI 
Western Federal Credit Union 
Western Federal Credit Union for camper 
Security Pacific Solar Loan 
Valley Bank VISA 
State of California taxes. 
15. The plaintiff has two life insurance policies, one 
with Delta Airlines for $100,000.00 and one with Beneficial 
Life Insurance for $100, 000. 00. 
16. The defendant employed counsel to represent her in 
this matter and does not have a ready source of assets from 
which she can pay for the services whiclf she has secured. 
17. The plaintiff has available, through his 
employment, health and dental insurance and will maintain 
health and dental insurance for Walter and Sean as long as it 
is available through his employment. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now 
makes and enters the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This court has jurisdiction over the parties and 
subject matter of this action. 
2. Each of the parties should be awarded a Decree of 
Divorce, terminating the marriage between them on the grounds 
of irreconcilable differences. 
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3. Care, custody and control of the minor child of 
the parties, Sean Howell, should be awarded to the defendant, 
subject to reasonable rights of visitation in the plaintiff. 
4. The plaintiff should be ordered to pay child 
support to the defendant for Sean in the amount of $1, 363. 00 
per month until Sean is 18 and graduated from high school with 
his regularly-scheduled class. Payments should be made on the 
20th of each month. 
5. The income exemption for Sean should be awarded to 
the defendant. 
6. The plaintiff should be ordered to pay alimony to 
the defendant based upon the standard of living enjoyed by the 
parties at the time of their separation in 1986. Accordingly, 
he should pay her $1,800. 00 per month, one-half on the 5th of 
each month; one-half on the 20th of each month until such 
time as she dies, remarries, cohabits with a man to whom she 
is not married, or further order of the court. 
7. The parties should divide the retirement plan 
benefits acquired by them during the course of their marriage 
at the value determined by this court on December 22, 1988, by 
appropriate qualified domestic relations order, that is, the 
Western Airlines Plan A, Plan B, and Plan D, and the Delta 
Savings Plan and Delta Plan, which should be effected by 
separate orders to implement the provision of the Decree of 
7 
Divorce. 
8. The military retirement plan of the parties, once 
finally valued and the period of service set, should be 
divided by application of the Woodward formula. The plaintiff 
should keep the defendant advised as to the progress of this 
inquiry and the actions and decisions of the United States 
Navy. 
9. Plaintiff should be awarded the IRA in his name at 
Merrill Lynch in the amount of $7, 546. 57 and the IRA at the 
Western Federal Credit Union of $4, 196.43, and the defendant 
should be awarded her IRA in the amount of $10, 397. 00. 
10. The plaintiff should be ordered to maintain the 
health and dental insurance that is available to him through 
his employment on both Sean and his older brother, Walter, so 
long as that insurance is available to him through the age of 
21. Each of the parties should pay one-half of any 
extraordinary medical, dental, orthodontic or eyecare expense 
which is not covered by insurance. 
11. The plaintiff has available to him life insurance 
in the sum of $100,000.00. He should be required to maintain 
Matthew and Sean as beneficiaries of that policy until they 
attain the age of 21 years or are married. After that occurs, 
he shall be free to name whomever he wishes as beneficiary of 
that insurance. To assist the children in assuring this 
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coverage, the plaintiff should provide them with the policy 
number and name of the insurance company. 
12. The plaintiff should be ordered to cooperate with 
the defendant in making available to her all health insurance 
benefits for which she can qualify under the COBRA provisions 
of the Internal Revenue Code. 
13. The home and real property in California, at 1767 
Calle Rocas, Camarillo, California, should be sold for the 
best possible price and at the earliest possible time. The 
net proceeds of sale divided equally between the parties. 
There is presently a debt due to the State of California for 
taxes. If it is determined that those are property taxes, 
they should be paid from the proceeds of sale of this property 
prior to division of the proceeds of sale. If it is 
determined that those are taxes for any other reason, the 
plaintiff should assume and pay those taxes and hold the 
defendant harmless therefrom. The plaintiff should be 
responsible for the sale of the California home, and should 
keep the defendant fully advised as to that transaction, and 
the defendant should take all actions necessary to effect 
sale. 
14. The home and real property in Utah should be 
placed for sale at the best possible price and sold at the 
earliest possible date. The plaintiff should pay the 
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mortgage for the months of February, March and April, 1989, 
and if the January house payment has not been made, he should 
make that payment. Thereafter, the defendant shall be 
responsible for those payments if the home is not sold. The 
defendant shall be responsible for this sale and shall keep 
the plaintiff advised as to that transaction and the parties 
shall divide equally the net proceeds of sale. 
15. The 8. 6023 shares of Delta stock and Continental 
Power Stock should be awarded to the plaintiff. 
16. The parties should sell one of the seven lots in 
Texas and divide the net proceeds of sale between them. Each 
should be awarded three of the remaining lots. 
17. Each of the parties have accumulated savings 
accounts in their own names and they should be awarded those 
savings, to-wit: the plaintiff should be awarded the Western 
Federal Credit Union account; the Ranier Bank account; and the 
Valley Bank account, while the defendant should be awarded the 
Mountain West Savings account and the Camarillo Community Bank 
account. 
18. The insurance proceeds for the 1977 Buick should 
be awarded to the defendant who should also be awarded the 
1980 Datsun 280Z. 
19. The 1987 Ford truck and camper should be awarded 
to the plaintiff* 
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20. The 1969 Ford automobile should be awarded to 
Matthew. 
21. The 1978 ski boat should be awarded to the 
defendant. 
22. The 1982 fold boat and engine should be awarded to 
the plaintiff. 
23. Each of the parties should be awarded the 
furnishings, fixtures, furniture and appliances in their own 
possession with the exception of the IBM computer and computer 
software in the plaintiff s possession which should be awarded 
to the defendant and the 35mm camera which should be awarded 
to the plaintiff. 
24. Each of the parties should be awarded one-half of 
the ivory collection. 
25. Each of the parties should be ordered to make 
available family photographs in their possession to the other 
for copying. The photographs should be divided fairly between 
them. 
26. The plaintiff has accounted for the $33,000.00 he 
removed from the retirement to the satisfaction of the court 
and no order is entered in regard to those funds which the 
court believes are appropriately resolved in the division of 
the marital estate as set forth above. 
27. Each of the parties should be ordered to assume 
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and pay the debts in their own name with the exception of the 
mortgage provisions set forth above, which, restated, are that 
the plaintiff should pay the mortgage on the California home 
and may use the rent received from the California home until 
its sale. The plaintiff should pay the mortgage payments on 
the Utah home for February, March, and April, 1989, and the 
January payment, if that has not been paid. Thereafter, the 
defendant should be responsible for payment of that debt. 
The plaintiff should pay the debts due and owing to: 
a. Weyerhauser Mortgage (Calif, home); 
b. Western Federal Credit Union (pick-up); 
c. Western Federal Credit Union (camper); 
d. Security Pacific solar loan; 
e. Valley Bank VISA; 
f. State of California taxes. 
The defendant should pay the debts due and owing to: 
a. Lincoln Mortgage (Utah home); 
b. Tracy Collins Bank; 
c. Camarillo Community Bank; 
d. Personal loan (attorney fees); 
e. Camarillo Bank VISA; 
f. Nordstroms; 
g. Weinstocks; 
h. ZCMI. 
28. The parties should consult with an accountant 
regarding the filing of amended joint 1986 and 1987 tax 
returns. If these can be filed and the parties save money and 
secure a refund in excess of the $2, 500. 00 that has been 
received by the plaintiff, they should do so and divide all 
refunds received in excess of the $2,500. 00 which has already 
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been received by the plaintiff. 
29. The plaintiff should be ordered to pay on behalf 
of the defendant the sum of $7, 500. 00 to assist her m the 
payment of her attorney fees within thirty (30) days from 
entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
DATED this day of , 1989. 
FRANK G. NOEL 
District Court Judge 
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APPROVED AS REFLECTING 
THE RULING OF THE COURT: 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
PAUL H. ULTAPI; 
Attorney for Defendant 
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I hereby certify that I caused to be maiied a true 
copy of the above and foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, this 1 % day of CZ^^f. 1989, t o : 
Mr. Paul Liapis 
Attorney at Law 
48 Post Office Place, Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
DAVID S/-DOLOWITZ 
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
of and for 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff 
525 East 100 South, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * 
WALTER JAMES HOWELL, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
BARBARA JOYCE HOWELL, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. D87-4343 
Judge Frank Noel 
* * * * * 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for 
trial on Thursday, the 22nd day of December, 1988, the 
Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding. The plaintiff was present 
in person and represented by counsel, David S. Dolowitz and 
John Mason. The defendant was present in person and 
represented by counsel, Paul H. Liapis. The court heard and 
considered the testimony of the parties, received exhibits 
into evidence and determined to take the matter under 
advisement. Thereafter, being advised in the premises, the 
court announced its decision in open court on the 19th day of 
January, 1989. The plaintiff then submitted proposed Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree to the court, 
provisions of which the defendant then objected. Those 
objections were heard and resolved before the court on April 
27, 1989. Accordingly, the court, having made and entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. This court has jurisdiction over the parties and 
subject matter of this action. 
2. Each of the parties is awarded a Decree of 
Divorce, terminating their marriage, 
3. Care, custody and control of the minor child of 
the parties, Sean Howell, is awarded to the defendant, 
subject to reasonable rights of visitation in the plaintiff. 
4. The plaintiff is ordered to pay child support to 
the defendant for Sean in the amount of $1, 363, 00 per month 
on the 20th of each month until Sean is 18 and graduates from 
high school with his regularly-scheduled class. 
5. The income exemption for Sean is awarded to the 
defendant. 
6. The plaintiff is ordered to pay alimony to the 
defendant in the sum of $1,800.00 per month, one-half on the 
5th of each month; one-half on the 20th of each month until 
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such time as she dies, remarries, cohabits with a man to whom 
she is not married, or further order of the court. 
7. The parties shall divide the retirement plan 
benefits, valued as of December 22, 1988, acquired by them 
during the course of their marriage by appropriate qualified 
domestic relations order, that is, the Western Airlines Plan 
A, Plan B, and Plan D, and the Delta Savings Plan and Delta 
Plan, which shall be effected by separate orders to implement 
the provision of the Decree of Divorce. 
8. The military retirement plan of the parties, once 
finally valued and the period of service set, shall be 
divided by application of the Woodward formula. The plaintiff 
shall keep the defendant advised as to the progress of this 
inquiry and the actions and decisions of the United States 
Navy. 
9. Plaintiff is awarded the IRA in his name at 
Merrill Lynch in the amount of $7, 546. 57 and the IRA at the 
Western Federal Credit Union in the amount of $4, 196. 43, and 
the defendant is awarded her IRA in the amount of $10, 397. 00, 
10. The plaintiff is ordered to maintain the health 
and dental insurance that is available to him through his 
employment on both Sean and his older brother, Walter, through 
the age of 21, so long as that insurance is available to him. 
Each of the parties shall pay one-half of any extra-
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ordinary medical, dental, orthodontic or eyecare expense 
which is not covered by insurance. 
11. The plaintiff has available to him life insurance 
in the sum of $100,000.00. He shall maintain Matthew and Sean 
as beneficiaries of that policy until they attain the age of 
21 years or are married. After that occurs, he shall be free 
to name whomever he wishes as beneficiary of that Insurance. 
To assist the children in assuring this coverage, the 
plaintiff shall provide them with the policy number and name 
of the insurance company. 
12. The plaintiff should be ordered to cooperate with 
the defendant in making available to her all health insurance 
benefits for which she can qualify under the COBRA provisions 
of the Internal Revenue Code. 
13. The home and real property in California, at 1767 
Calle Rocas, Camarillo, California, legally described as: 
LOT 44, TRACT NO. 1359, in the County of 
Ventura, State of California, as per Map 
recorded in Book 35, Page 59 of Maps, in 
the office of the County Recorder of said 
county, 
shall be sold for the best possible price and at the earliest 
possible time. The net proceeds of sale shall be divided 
equally between the parties. There is presently a debt due to 
the State of California for taxes. If it is determined that 
those are property taxes, they shall be paid from the 
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proceeds of sale of this property prior to division of the 
proceeds of sale. If it is determined that those are taxes 
for any other reason, the plaintiff shall assume and pay 
those taxes and hold the defendant harmless therefrom. The 
plaintiff shall be responsible for the sale of the California 
home/ and should keep the defendant fully advised as to that 
transaction, and the defendant should take all actions 
necessary to effect the sale, 
14, The home and real property in Utah, at 8241 Top of 
the World Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, and the adjacent lot, 
legally described as: 
(House) LOT 18, TOP OF THE WORLD #3 SUBDIVISION; 
(Lot) BEG S 84 FT FR NE CORK>LOT 17, TOP OF THE 
WORLD #3 SUBDIVISION; S 84 FT; E 100 FT; 
W 100 FT TO BEG. 0. 2 AC M OR L; 
shall be placed for sale at the best possible price and sold 
at the earliest possible date. The plaintiff shall pay the 
mortgage for the months of February, March and April, 1989, 
and if the January house payment has not been made, he shall 
make that payment. Thereafter, the defendant shall be 
responsible for those payments if the home is not sold. The 
defendant shall be responsible for this sale and shall keep 
the plaintiff advised as to that transaction and the parties 
shall divide equally the net proceeds of sale. 
15. The 8.6023 shares of Delta stock and Continental 
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Power Stock are awarded to the plaintiff. 
16. The parties shall sell one of the seven lots in 
Texas and divide the net proceeds of sale between them. Each 
is awarded three of the remaining lots. 
17. Each of the parties has accumulated savings 
accounts in their own names and they are awarded those 
savings, to-wit: the plaintiff is awarded the Western Federal 
Credit Union account; the Ranier Bank account; and the Valley 
Bank account, while the defendant is awarded the Mountain 
West Savings account and the Camarillo Community Bank 
account. 
18. The insurance proceeds for the 1977 Buick are 
awarded to the defendant who is also awarded the 1980 Datsun 
280Z. 
19. The 1987 Ford truck and camper are awarded to the 
plaintiff. 
20. The 1969 Ford automobile is awarded to Matthew. 
21. The 1978 ski boat is awarded to the defendant. 
22. The 1982 fold boat and engine are awarded to the 
plaintiff. 
23. Each of the parties is awarded the furnishings, 
fixtures, furniture and appliances in their own possession 
with the exception of the IBM computer and computer software 
in the plaintiff s possession which are awarded to the 
defendant and the 35mm camera which is awarded to the 
plaintiff. 
24. Each of the parties is awarded one-half of the 
ivory collection. 
25. Each of the parties is ordered to make available 
family photographs in their possession to the other for 
copying. The photographs are to be divided fairly between 
them. 
26. The plaintiff has accounted for the $33,000.00 he 
removed from the retirement to the satisfaction of the court 
and no order is entered in regard to those funds which the 
court believes are appropriately resolved in the division of 
the marital estate as set forth above. 
27. Each of the parties is ordered to assume and pay 
the debts in their own name with the exception of the 
mortgage provisions set forth above, which, restated, are that 
the plaintiff shall pay the mortgage on the California home 
and may use the rent received from the California home until 
its sale. The plaintiff shall pay the mortgage payments on 
the Utah home for February, March, and April, 1989, and the 
January payment, if that has not been paid. Thereafter, the 
defendant shall be responsible for payment of that debt. The 
plaintiff shall pay the debts due and owing to: 
a. Weyerhauser Mortgage (Calif, home); 
b. Western Federal Credit Union (pick-up); 
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c. Western Federal Credit Union (camper); 
d. Security Pacific solar loan; 
e. Valley Bank VISA; 
f. State of California taxes. 
and the defendant shall pay the debts due and owing to: 
a. Lincoln Mortgage (Utah home); 
b. Tracy Collins Bank; 
c. Camarillo Community Bank; 
d. Personal loan (attorney fees); 
e. Camarillo Bank VISA; 
f. Nordstroms; 
g. Weinstocks; 
h. ZCMI. 
28. The parties are ordered to consult with an 
accountant regarding the filing of amended joint 1986 and 1987 
tax returns. If these can be filed and the parties save money 
and secure a refund in excess of the $2, 500. 00 that has been 
received by the plaintiff, they shall do so and divide all 
refunds received in excess of the $2,500. 00 which has already 
been received by the plaintiff. 
29. The plaintiff is ordered to pay on behalf of the 
defendant the sum of $7,500.00 to assist her in the payment of 
her attorney fees within thirty (30) days from entry of the 
Decree of Divorce. 
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1 A. I DO. 
2 Q. YOU HAVE NOT LIVED WITH YOUR WIFE SINCE FILING 
3 THAT FIRST DIVORCE ACTION? 
4 A. THAT'S TRUE. 
5 Q. YOU INDICATED THERE WERE MAYBE TWO DAYS — 
6 A. THAT IS CORRECT. 
7 Q. — THAT YOU TRIED BETWEEN THE TWO ACTIONS? 
8 A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
9 Q. DO YOU BELIEVE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN YOU ARE 
10 IRRECONCILABLE? 
11 A. I DO. 
12 Q. COULD YOU DESCRIBE BRIEFLY, AND NOT IN INFINITE 
13 DETAIL, THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN YOU THAT YOU BELIEVE ARE 
14 IRRECONCILABLE? 
15 A. OVER THE YEARS OF OUR MARRIAGE I FELT LIKE I'VE 
16 BEEN SHAMED IN FRONT OF MY CHILDREN WHEN I WAS REFUSED ANY 
17 KIND OF CONTROL WITH THEM. AND I FELT AS IF I WAS THERE AS 
18 SOMEONE TO PROVIDE AN INCOME. AND BEING AN AVIATOR ALL MY 
19 LIFE, I HAD NOT BEEN HOME THAT MUCH, AND FOUND MYSELF IN A 
20 POSITION WHERE I WOULD ASK THAT THINGS BE DONE AND THE 
21 CHILDREN FOLLOW CERTAIN RESTRICTIONS. AND I FELT THAT 
22 WASN'T BEING HANDLED PROPERLY. I WAS BEING REBUKED IN 
23 FRONT OF MY CHILDREN; THEREFORE, I FELT LIKE THEY LOST ALL 
24 RESPECT FOR ME. 
25 Q. DID YOU TRY TO WORK OUT THOSE PROBLEMS? 
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1 RELATIVE TO THE INCOME EARNED BETWEEN- 1363 AND THE PRESENT, 
2 OVER THE LAST 20 YEARS OF YOUR MARRIAGE? 
3 A. YES, SIR. 
4 Q. YOU HAVE IN HERE IN COURT TODAY, THE RECORDS 
5 FROM THE COMPANY SHOWING WHAT YOU'VE BEEN PAID IN EACH OF 
6 THOSE YEARS? 
7 A. THAT IS CORRECT. 
8 Q. YOU HAVE GONE THROUGH — I'VE HANDED YOU A 
9 DOCUMENT THAT'S BEEN MARKED AS EXHIBIT 2-P. DOES THAT 
10 REFLECT YOUR EARNINGS BETWEEN 1968 AND 1988, WITH THE 
11 EXCEPTION OF THE DECEMBER 1988 PAYMENT? 
12 A. THAT HAS NOT BEEN RECEIVED. 
13 Q. I WANT TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION PARTICULARLY TO 
14 THE YEARS 1982, '83, '84, '85 AND '86. THOSE SHOW THE 
15 INCOME AS BEING ALMOST EXACTLY THE SAME FOR THOSE YEARS? 
16 A. AS A MATTER OF FACT, STARTING 1981. 
17 Q. FOR WHOM WERE YOU WORKING IN THOSE YEARS? 
18 A. WESTERN AIRLINES, PRIMARILY. THE LAST TWO 
19 YEARS THERE WOULD BE A TRANSITION TO DELTA. 
20 Q. AND I NOTICE THAT THERE IS A DROP, THAT IN 
21 1982 — THAT YOUR INCOME GOES UP IN '78, UP IN '79, UP IN 
22 '80, AND THEN DROPS TO THE LEVEL THAT IT STAYS PRETTY MUCH 
23 BETWEEN 1981 AND 1986. WHAT HAPPENED IN THOSE YEARS THAT 
24 IT STAYS IN SUCH A NARROW RANGE? 
25 A. WESTERN AIRLINES WAS GOING THROUGH FINANCIAL 
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1 PROBLEMS, IN ORDER ^0 MAINTAIN A VIABLE.COMPANY THEY ASKED 
2 THE PILOTS TO TAKE A PAY CUT. 
3 Q. NOW, TURNING TO YOUR TIME LINE, AGAIN, EXHIBIT 
4 17, I SEE THAT IN THAT SAME PERIOD OF TIME YOU FILED FOR 
5 DIVORCE, DISMISSED IT, MOVE WITH THE FAMILY TO UTAH AND 
6 FILE AN ACTION, FIRST ACTION IN '84, THEN ANOTHER IN '86, 
7 AND DIVORCE ACTIONS MOVING IN AND OUT. WHAT IS GOING ON 
8 BETWEEN YOU AND YOUR WIFE IN TERMS OF — PARTICULARLY THE 
9 MOVE TO UTAH? 
10 A. AS YOU SEE, THE FIRST DIVORCE ACTION WAS FILED 
11 IN 1981. PRIOR TO THAT TIME IS WHEN OUR CHILDREN HAD GROWN 
12 UP AND WERE NOW TEENAGERS. THE PROBLEMS HAD BECOME ACUTE 
13 AS TEENAGER PROBLEMS ARE, HAVING LOST WHAT I FELT WAS 
14 CONTROL OF MY FAMILY AND NOT BEING ABLE TO GET THEM TO 
15 CONFORM TO WHAT I THOUGHT WAS REASONABLE GUIDELINES AS FAR 
16 AS THE WAY THEY LIVED AND THE WAY THEY BEHAVED. 
17 Q. IN 1980 THERE'S AN ENTRY HERE FROM JUDY 
18 MONTGOMERY. WHO IS THAT? 
19 A. SHE IS A FLIGHT ATTENDANT FOR — AT THAT 
20 TIME, WESTERN AIRLINES. 
21 Q. YOU'VE ENTERED INTO AN EMOTIONAL RELATIONSHIP 
22 WITH HER? 
23 A. I HAVE. 
24 Q. HAS THAT HAD ANY IMPACT ON THE MARRIAGE? 
25 A. I DON'T THINK SO. 
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1 Q. DID IT HAVE ANY IMPACT"ON YOUR SATISFACTION 
2 WITH THE MARRIAGE RELATIONSHIP? 
3 A. NO. I WAS COMPLETELY DISSATISFIED WITH THE 
4 MARRIAGE PRIOR TO EVER MEETING HER. 
5 Q. DESPITE THAT, YOU STILL — THE TIME LINE 
6 INDICATES THAT YOU ENTERED INTO EFFORTS OF COUNSELING, 
7 MOVED THE FAMILY, TOOK A NUMBER OF EFFORTS TO TRY TO PULL 
8 THINGS TOGETHER? 
9 A. THAT'S TRUE. AND THIS HAPPENED BEFORE I EVER 
10 MET MISS MONTGOMERY. 
11 Q. NOW YOUR INCOME THROUGHOUT THIS ENTIRE PERIOD 
12 OF TIME REALLY STAYED VERY LEVEL? 
13 A. YES. 
14 Q. IT STARTS RISING AGAIN IN 1987. WERE YOU 
15 RESIDING WITH YOUR WIFE IN 1987? 
16 A. I WAS NOT. 
17 Q. HAD YOU RESIDED WITH HER IN 1986? 
18 A. NO — WELL, UNTIL NOVEMBER 22ND, I BELIEVE, OF 
19 '86; YES, NOVEMBER 22ND. 
20 Q. IN TERMS OF STANDARD OF LIVING, WOULD YOU SAY 
21 YOU'VE ESTABLISHED ANY KIND OF STANDARD OF LIVING BETWEEN 
22 1981 AND '86, BASED UPON YOUR INCOME? 
23 A. YES. 
24 Q. WAS THAT THE INCOME THAT YOU USED WHEN YOU 
25 BOUGHT THE HOUSE AT TOP OF THE WORLD DRIVE? 
i THE LIVING STANDARD THAT YOU ENJOYED WHEN YOU WERE LIVING 
2 TOGETHER WAS THAT WHICH WAS BASED UPON THE YEARS 1981 TO 
3 1986? 
4 A. I THINK THAT'S REASONABLE, YES. 
5 Q. THE ONLY RESIDING TOGETHER YOU DID IN 1987 OR 
6 '88 — AS YOU INDICATED, TWO DAYS — YOU THINK WAS AFTER 
7 THE DISMISSAL OF THE OTHER DIVORCE ACTION? 
8 A. I THINK IT WAS TWO AND A HALF DAYS, YES. 
9 Q. WE WOULD OFFER EXHIBIT 2-P. 
10 THE COURT: ANY OBJECTION? 
11 MR. LIAPIS: NO. 
12 THE COURT: IT WILL BE RECEIVED. 
13 Q. (BY MR. DOLOWITZ) NOW, YOU HAVE RECEIVED A 
14 NUMBER OF PAY RAISES, I GUESS SINCE WESTERN MERGED WITH 
15 DELTA? 
16 A. THE PAY RAISES BEGAN WHEN THE PILOT UNION 
17 NEGOTIATED OUR CONTRACT WITH WESTERN AIRLINES JUST PRIOR TO 
18 THE MERGER. 
19 Q. THE MONEY THAT YOU'RE RECEIVING, AND I'M GOING 
20 TO ROUND NUMBERS UP, LOOKING AT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
21 EXHIBIT 2 AND WHAT I SPELL OUT, AND THE TYPES OF MONTHLY 
22 INCOME SHOWN ON THERE, HAS CREATED NOW TO THE POINT WHERE 
23 YOU'RE RECEIVING CLOSE TO DOUBLE WHAT YOU WERE RECEIVING IN 
24 1986? 
25 A. YES, SIR. 
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1 hR. DOLOWITZ: WE WOULD OFFER EXHIBIT 6 FOR 
2 ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES. 
3 MR. LIAPIS: NO OBJECTION. 
4 THE COURT: #6 WILL BE RECEIVED. 
5 Q. (BY MR. DOLOWITZ) AND THERE'S A FEDERAL TAX 
6 WITHHELD — HAVE YOU WORKED WITH YOUR ACCOUNTANTS SO YOU 
7 KNOW THAT IS AN APPROPRIATE AMOUNT TO BE WITHHELD AND PAY 
8 YOUR TAXES? 
9 A. I'VE HAD THE SAME ACCOUNTANT SEVERAL YEARS AND 
10 I THINK HE'S DETERMINED IT TO BE THAT MUCH. I THINK THAT 
11 AMOUNT ALLOWED FOR THE ALIMONY PAYMENT THAT I WAS MAKING. 
12 Q. YOU'VE BEEN MAKING ALIMONY PAYMENTS IN 1987 AND 
13 '88, PURSUANT TO THIS COURT ORDER? 
14 A. YES, SIR. 
15 Q. AND THEN THERE WAS A PRIOR COURT ORDER? 
16 A. ALIMONY PAYMENTS BEGAN IN DECEMBER OF 1987, 
17 TEMPORARY ALIMONY. 
18 Q. FICA IS WITHHELD ON THE FIRST $39,000? 
19 A. YES, SIR. 
20 Q. THIS SAYS FAMILY CARE SAVINGS PLAN. WHAT IS 
21 THAT? 
22 A. I THINK ONE OF THE'EXHIBITS WE HAD EARLIER, IT 
23 SHOWS A DELTA SAVINGS PLAN. 
24 Q. IT'S ON EXHIBIT 1 AND EXHIBIT 5, THERE'S 
25 SOMETHING CALLED DELTA SAVINGS PLAN? 
1 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR. DOLOWITZ: 
3 Q. WOULD YOU PLEASE STATE YOUR FULL NAME AND 
4 PRESENT PROFESSIONAL ADDRESS. 
5 A. YES. MY NAME IS CONNIE ROMBOY. I'M WITH THE 
6 CAREER GUIDANCE CENTER, 449 EAST 21ST SOUTH. 
7 Q. ARE YOU PRESENTLY PRACTICING A PROFESSION, MISS 
8 ROMBOY? 
9 A. YES, I AM. 
10 Q. WHAT IS THAT? 
11 A. I AM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE CAREER 
12 GUIDANCE CENTER. WE ARE A BUSINESS THAT SPECIALIZES IN 
13 REHABILITATION, VOCATIONAL EVALUATION AND JOB PLACEMENT. 
14 Q. HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN ENGAGED IN THAT WORK? 
15 A. SINCE 1971. I STARTED WITH THE STATE OF UTAH 
16 IN 71, WORKED WITH THEM FOR SIX YEARS. IN 1976 MY HUSBAND 
17 AND I OPENED THE CAREER GUIDANCE CENTER. 
18 Q. COULD YOU DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATION THAT PRECEDED 
19 YOUR GOING INTO THAT BUSINESS? 
20 A. IN 1968, I GRADUATED FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF 
21 UTAH WITH A DEGREE IN SOCIOLOGY. IN 1971, AFTER I WAS 
22 EMPLOYED WITH THE STATE QF UTAH, I WENT BACK TO SCHOOL AT 
23 THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, STUDYING EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY AND 
24 I HAVE APPROXIMATELY 60 CREDIT HOURS OF POST-GRADUATE WORK. 
25 Q. HAVE YOU ATTAINED AN ADVANCED DEGREE IN THAT 
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1 MR. DOLOWITZ: I WOULD ASK MISS ROMBOY TO STEP 
2 DOWN FOR A MOMENT. I WOULD CALL MRS. BARBARA HOWELL. 
3 THE COURT: MRS. HOWELL, WOULD YOU COME 
4 FORWARD, PLEASE. 
5 
6 BARBARA JOYCE CLOPTON HOWELL 
7 CALLED AS A WITNESS HEREIN, HAVING BEEN DULY 
8 SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
9 
10 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
11 BY MR. DOLOWITZ: 
12 Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR FULL NAME AND PRESENT 
13 ADDRESS. 
14 A. BARBARA JOYCE CLOPTON HOWELL, 8241 TOP OF THE 
15 WORLD DRIVE; SALT LAKE CITY. 
16 Q. YOU'RE THE DEFENDANT IN THIS MATTER? 
17 A. YES, I AM. 
18 Q. WOULD YOU PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATION? 
19 A. I GRADUATED FROM HIGH SCHOOL IN 1956. AND 
20 SINCE THAT TIME I'VE TAKEN VARIOUS COLLEGE COURSES WHICH 
21 HAVE PROBABLY ACCUMULATED CLOSE TO 30 HOURS. 
22 Q. THAT WAS JUNIOR COLLEGE. YOU ALSO ATTENDED THE 
23 UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA? 
24 A. THAT WAS WHEN I LIVED IN CUBA. 
25 Q. IS IT MOORE PARK COLLEGE? 
1 GIRL. 
2 Q. WHAT RESPONSIBILITIES DID YOU CARRY OUT FOR 
3 KELLY? 
4 A. I WAS A DEMONSTRATOR IN A SUPERMARKET ON TWO OF 
5 THE ASSIGNMENTS THAT I HAD. AND I PERFORMED SOME TYPING 
6 TASKS AT ANOTHER ONE. 
7 Q. HAVE YOU WORKED WITH A PROCESSOR? 
8 A. YES. 
9 Q. WITH WHAT WORD PROCESSORS HAVE YOU WORKED? 
10 A. WITH THE I.B.M. P.C. THAT WE HAD IN OUR HOME, 
11 AND A SMITH CORONA, WHICH IS COMPATIBLE TO THE I.B.M. 
12 MR. DOLOWITZ: I HAVE NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
13 Q. (BY MR. DOLOWITZ) WHAT IS YOUR TYPING SPEED, 
14 DO YOU KNOW? 
15 A. I THINK IT'S 50 W.P.M. 
16 Q. WERE YOU ALSO THE COMPANY SECRETARY FOR YOUR 
17 LANDSCAPING COMPANY BETWEEN 1978 AND 1981? 
18 A. YES, I WAS. 
19 Q. DID YOU DO ALL THE BOOK WORK? 
20 A. I DID WORK UP FOR QUARTERLY REPORTS. 
21 Q. DID YOU DO THE PAYROLL? 
22 A. YES. 
23 Q. TAX REPORTS? 
24 A. UP TO THE QUARTER REPORTS, YES. 
25 Q. AND WHAT WAS THE SIZE OF THAT BUSINESS, WHAT 
1 DEVELOPMENT AT MOORE PARK COLLEGE. 
2 Q. THAT WAS PART OF THE 30 HOURS? 
3 A. YES. 
4 Q. ARE YOU CERTIFIED IN THAT AREA? 
5 A. NO, I'M NOT. 
6 Q. YOU INDICATED THAT THE FURNITURE STORE IS 
7 CLOSING. WHY ARE THEY DOING THAT? 
8 A. THEY'RE GOING OUT OF BUSINESS AFTER 13 YEARS. 
9 THEY'VE DECIDED TO SELL THE BUILDING AND GO OUT OF 
10 BUSINESS. 
11 MR. LIAPIS: THAT'S ALL. 
12 MR. DOLOWITZ: I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER OF THIS 
13 WITNESS. I WOULD RE-CALL CONNIE ROMBOY. 
14 THE COURT: MISS ROMBOY. 
15 (PREVIOUSLY SWORN) 
16 
17 CONTINUED DIRECT EXAMINATION 
18 BY MR. DOLOWITZ: 
19 Q. MISS ROMBOY, YOU HAVE BEEN PRESENT DURING THE 
20 TESTIMONY OF MRS. HOWELL? 
21 A. YES, SIR, I HAVE. 
22 Q. YOU'VE HEARD HER TESTIFY ABOUT HER EDUCATION 
23 AND JOB EXPERIENCE? 
24 A. YES, I HAVE. 
25 Q. HOW DID THAT COMPARE — WERE THERE ANY 
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1 DIFFERENCES IN TERMS OF THE OPINION THAT YOU'VE FORMULATED 
2 FROM THE INFORMATION YOU RECITED YOU'VE BEEN GIVEN BEFORE 
3 SHE TESTIFIED, AND THAT OPINION AFTER SHE TESTIFIED? 
4 A. THERE'S NOT SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES EXCEPT THAT I 
5 DO BELIEVE, BASED UPON HER TESTIMONY, THAT SHE HAS MORE 
6 CLERIAL SKILLS OR A BETTER FOUNDATION IN CLERIAL SKILLS 
7 THAN I HAD ORIGINALLY THOUGHT. 
8 Q. BASED UPON THAT, DO YOU HAVE AN OPINION AS TO 
9 THE POSITIONS WHICH ARE AVAILABLE TO HER IN THIS AREA AT 
10 WHICH SHE COULD WORK? 
11 A. YES. AND I HAVE THOSE DIVIDED INTO SEVERAL 
12 CATEGORIES. AS YOU ASKED ME FOR — WOULD YOU LIKE ME TO 
13 JUST RUN THROUGH THOSE? 
14 Q. YES. 
15 MR. LIAPIS: I'LL FORMULATE AN OBJECTION AT 
16 THIS SORT OF SPECULATION. THE TESTIMONY IS SHE DOES NOT 
17 WORK IN THOSE AREAS. WHAT THE WITNESS WOULD BE TESTIFYING 
18 TO WOULD BE SPECULATIVE IN NATURE, CONTRARY TO THE FACTS 
19 WHICH WOULD BE ESTABLISHED WHEN FULL TESTIMONY IS PRESENTED 
20 BY MRS. HOWELL. THE AREAS I WAS NOT GOING INTO, SUCH AS 
21 THE REASON FOR WORKING, NOT WORKING, NEED TO WORK, INCOMES 
22 AND SO FORTH, IT'S SPECULATIVE. 
23 MR. DOLOWITZ: I BELIEVE, YOUR HONOR, THAT 
24 EXPERT OPINION IS NOT SPECULATIVE, IT'S BEEN DETERMINED TO 
25 HAVE SUFFICIENT INDICIA OF CREDIBILITY, AND AN EXPERT IS 
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1 ALLOWED TO TESTIFY FOR SOMEONE WHO HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO 
2 TESTIFY. AND IF THERE'S A QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER MRS. 
3 ROMBOY IS AN EXPERT, I THINK SHE IS. I'VE ESTABLISHED HER 
4 CREDENTIALS AND SHE'S ESTABLISHED THAT BEFORE TRIBUNALS, 
5 ADMINISTRATIVE AND OFFICIAL, THAT SHE IS AN EXPERT, BASED 
6 UPON THAT FOUNDATION AND HAS TESTIFIED AS AN EXPERT AND MAY 
7 DO SO IN THIS INSTANCE. 
8 THE COURT: MR. LIAPIS. 
9 MR. LIAPIS: WHAT I'M TRYING TO GET TO IS THAT 
10 THERE IS — THAT THE SPECULATIVE PART OF THIS IS THAT, 
11 NUMBER ONE, THERE'S A NEED FOR THE DEFENDANT TO WORK; 
12 NUMBER TWO, THERE'S A DESIRE; NUMBER THREE, THAT ALIMONY, 
13 FOR INSTANCE, THAT WOULD BE PAID, SHOULD BE PAID UNDER THE 
14 CASE LAW, WOULD BE MORE THAN SUFFICIENT. NONE OF THOSE 
15 HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED. 
16 THE COURT: THE QUESTION, I BELIEVE, SIMPLY 
17 GOES MORE TO HER QUALIFICATIONS. 
18 MR. DOLOWITZ: AS I UNDERSTAND THE OBJECTION. 
19 BECAUSE IF YOU'RE DEALING WITH A QUESTION OF RELEVANCY, I'M 
20 PREPARED TO ARGUE THAT THE TEST IS OR PARTICULAR AREA OF 
21 FOCUS THIS EVIDENCE IS OFFERED FOR IN DETERMINING ALIMONY, 
22 IS THE ABILITY OF A POTENTIAL ALIMONY RECIPIENT TO PROVIDE 
23 INCOME FOR THEMSELVES. 
24 THE COURT: I THINK THE QUESTION IS VERY 
25 NARROW. I'M GOING TO CONSIDER IT TO BE VERY NARROW. OF 
1 COURSE* ALL OF THESE OTHER FACTORS WILL HAVE TO BE TAKEN 
2 INTO CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT, BUT I THINK I'LL ALLOW THE 
3 WITNESS TO ANSWER THAT QUESTION. OVERRULED. 
4 THE WITNESS: OKAY, ONCE AGAIN, BASED UPON MY 
5 PREPARATION FOR THIS CASE, I TOOK A LOOK AT SEVERAL 
6 DIFFERENT JOB CATEGORIES, BASED PRIMARILY UPON THIS 
7 INDIVIDUAL'S PAST WORK EXPERIENCE. IF WE WERE TO CONSIDER 
8 THE AREA OF A CHILD CARE WORKER SOLELY, STATEWIDE AVERAGE 
9 FOR THAT PARTICULAR JOB AS AN ENTRY LEVEL WAGE IS $3.45 AN 
10 HOUR. IF AN INDIVIDUAL WORKED FULL-TIME AT THAT, THAT 
11 WOULD RESULT IN INCOME OF APPROXIMATELY $7,200.00 A YEAR. 
12 IN THE CURRENT YEAR, 1988, THERE WERE 106 
13 OPENINGS, AT LEAST THAT WENT THROUGH JOB SERVICE. 
14 DAY CARE ATTENDANTS WORKING IN SCHOOL 
15 DISTRICTS, OFTEN CALLED A TEACHERS AIDE, PAYS $4.69 AN 
16 HOUR. THOSE ARE USUALLY NINE MONTH CONTRACTS, WOULD BE 
17 APPROXIMATELY $7,700.00, $7,700.00 A YEAR. 
18 DAY CARE ATTENDANTS WORKING IN INSTITUTIONS 
19 SUCH AS AMERICAN FORK, Y.M.C.A., SO ON, THE WAGE IS $4.71. 
20 AND THE YEARLY WAGE WOULD BE 9,000, APPROXIMATELY 
21 $9,800.00. FOR OPENINGS IN THE SCHOOL, AGAIN IN THE YEAR 
22 OF 1988, WE HAD 72 LISTED WITH JOB SERVICE AND OTHER, 
23 INSTITUTIONS 31. 
24 IN TERMS OF THE SECRETARIAL AREA, ORIGINALLY, I 
25 HAD TAKEN A LOOK AT AN INDIVIDUAL WHO ABSOLUTELY HAD VERY 
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1 MARGINAL SECRETARIAL SKILLS THAT WOULD HAVE TO START AT A 
2 BASICALLY UNSKILLED CLERIAL JOB. WE WOULD CALL THAT A 
3 GENERAL CLERK. I HAVE THOSE AT 4.11 AN HOUR. THAT WOULD 
4 RESULT IN AN ANNUAL INCOME OF APPROXIMATELY $8,500.00. AND 
5 THERE WAS 1,180 OPENINGS LISTED WITH JOB SERVICE. 
6 JUST AS AN ENTRY LEVEL SECRETARY, WHICH AGAIN 
7 AS I MENTIONED BEFORE, BASED UPON THE TESTIMONY I HEARD, I 
8 THINK IT SEEMS TO BE MORE REALISTIC FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL 
9 THAN I HAD ORIGINALLY THOUGHT. THE AVERAGE STATEWIDE 
10 SALARY IS $5.89 ENTRY LEVEL, AND THAT WOULD RESULT IN 
11 APPROXIMATELY $12,200.00 A YEAR. LAST YEAR THERE WERE 866 
12 OPENINGS LISTED WITH JOB SERVICE. 
13 THE AREA OF FURNITURE SALES IS SOMEWHAT MORE 
14 DIFFICULT TO QUANTIFY. BASED UPON THE LABOR MARKET 
15 ANALYSIS THAT I DID, YOU'VE GOT A MINIMUM OF BETWEEN A 
16 THOUSAND, $1,400 A MONTH THAT A LOWER PRODUCING SALESPERSON 
17 WORKING BASICALLY ON COMMISSION WOULD BE EXPECTED TO 
18 PRODUCE. AND OF COURSE AT THE HIGH END THERE IS NO LIMIT. 
19 I THINK ONE POSSIBLE DRAWBACK WITH THE FURNITURE 
20 SALES, HOWEVER, IS THAT EVERY COMPANY I CONTACTED SAID THAT 
21 IF THEY HAD ONE OR TWO TURNOVERS A YEAR, ONE OR TWO 
22 OPENINGS, THEY WOULD CONSIDER THAT A LARGE TURNOVER. SO I 
23 THINK THAT'S A DIFFICULT FIELD TO BREAK IN WITH A COMPANY 
24 WHERE THE EARNING POTENTIAL IS GREAT. BUT ONCE AGAIN AT 
25 THE LOWER LEVEL YOU WERE DEALING WITH ANYWHERE FROM A 
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1 THOUSAND TO $1,400 A MONTH, BASED UPON THE WORK EXPERIENCE. 
2 I ALSO THINK THERE WERE SEVERAL OTHER POSITIONS 
3 THAT AN INDIVIDUAL WITH THIS BACKGROUND COULD CONSIDER; 
4 THAT BEING A SALESCLERK IN THE RETAIL INDUSTRY. THAT 
5 CURRENTLY STATEWIDE IS PAYING $3.73 AN HOUR. THAT WOULD 
6 RESULT IN AN ANNUAL INCOME OF APPROXIMATELY $7,700.00. 
7 LAST YEAR THERE WERE 401 OPENINGS LISTED LAST YEAR WITH JOB 
8 SERVICE. A JOB AS A CASHIER CHECKER, WHICH IS I THINK 
9 ANOTHER REALISTIC OPTION, COULD BE ANOTHER POSSIBLE CHOICE, 
10 WAS AT $3.75 AN HOUR. THAT RESULTED IN AN ANNUAL INCOME OF 
11 APPROXIMATELY $7,800.00. THERE WERE 1,504 OPENINGS LAST 
12 YEAR, AGAIN ACCORDING TO JOB SERVICE. THE UNSKILLED JOB OF 
13 CASHIER CURRENTLY IS PAYING STATEWIDE AN AVERAGE OF $4.05 
14 AN HOUR. THAT WOULD RESULT IN AN ANNUAL INCOME OF 
15 APPROXIMATELY $8,400.00, AND LAST YEAR, AGAIN, JOB SERVICE 
16 LISTED 308 OPENINGS. 
17 MR. DOLOWITZ: I HAVE NO FURTHER QUESTIONS, 
18 YOUR HONOR. 
19 THE COURT: MR. LIAPIS? 
20 
21 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
22 BY MR. LIAPIS: 
23 Q. WOULD YOU DEFINE SOME TERMS FOR US. IF YOU SAY 
24 "106 OPENINGS", WHAT DOES THAT MEAN? 
25 A. THAT MEANS EMPLOYERS THAT WOULD CALL IN AT JOB 
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1 A. YES. 
2 Q. AND SHE SUFFERED ALONG WITH YOU, GOING THROUGH 
3 THAT PERIOD IN THE PAY CUTS, DIDN'T SHE? 
4 A. YES. 
5 Q. AS A RESULT OF THAT, WESTERN FINANCIALLY TURNED 
6 THEMSELVES AROUND AND WERE SUBSEQUENTLY ACQUIRED BY DELTA, 
7 CORRECT? 
8 A. CORRECT. 
9 Q. AND AS A RESULT OF THAT MERGER YOU ARE NOW 
10 RECEIVING GREATER SUMS BY WAY OF COMPENSATION AS A PILOT 
11 THAN YOU HAD BEEN WITH WESTERN? 
12 A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
13 Q. AND IS IT YOUR TESTIMONY, SIR, YOU WANT MRS. 
14 HOWELL NOW NOT TO SHARE IN THAT BENEFIT THAT YOU CAME 
15 THROUGH? 
16 A. THOSE BENEFITS DIDN'T EXIST WHILE I WAS LIVING 
17 WITH MRS. HOWELL. 
18 Q. SO YOUR ANSWER IS, YES, YOU DON'T WANT HER TO 
19 SHARE? 
20 A. NO. 
21 Q. BUT SHE SHARED WITH YOU WHEN THE TIMES WERE 
22 LEAN; IS THAT CORRECT? 
23 A. IF YOU'LL LOOK AND SEE, THE REDUCTION FOR THOSE 
24 LAST FIVE OR SIX YEARS — IN OTHER WORDS, WHAT THAT 
25 ACTUALLY MEANT WAS THERE WAS REALLY NO INCREASE IN PAY 
1 WHILE THE COST OF LIVING WAS GOING UP. 
2 Q. SIR, YOUR EXHIBIT 3 — EXCUSE ME, NOT 3, YOUR 
3 EXHIBIT THAT LISTED THE INCOMES FAILED TO INCLUDE IN THAT 
4 ANY INCOME FOR THE RENTAL OF THE CALIFORNIA HOME, 
5 DIVIDENDS, SO OTHER INCOME YOU DIDN'T INCLUDE THAT IN THAT 
6 EXHIBIT, DID YOU? 
7 A. THOSE WERE WESTERN AND DELTA PAY STUBS. 
8 Q. ONLY? 
9 A. YES. 
10 Q. AND YOU DID HAVE EXTRA INCOME FOR THE YEARS 
11 '85, '86, AND '84, FOR THAT MATTER, DIDN'T YOU? 
12 A. '84, I DON'T BELIEVE WE DID, BECAUSE THE HOUSE 
13 WASN'T RENTED. I'D HAVE TO LOOK AT THE RECORDS. BUT 
14 WHATEVER THE RENTAL WAS, THAT WAS NOT INCLUDED. 
15 Q. YOU HAVE DIVIDEND INCOME, DID YOU NOT? 
16 A. I DON'T KNOW. 
17 Q. AND YOU HAD INTEREST INCOME? 
18 A. I WOULD HAVE TO LOOK AT MY INCOME TAX — FOR 
19 WHAT? 
20 Q. DURING THE YEAR '85. 
21 A. NO. 
22 Q. YOU HAD NO INTEREST INCOME, NO SAVINGS UPON 
23 WHICH INTEREST WAS EARNED? 
24 A. IN '85? 
25 Q. YES. 
1 A. THE ONLY THING WOULD BE MERRILL LYNCH. I WOULD 
2 HAVE TO LOOK AT THOSE RECORDS. YOU COULD FIND OUT FROM MY 
3 INCOME TAX. I MIGHT ADD IN THOSE YEARS, BECAUSE OF THE 
4 HIGH COST OF LIVING IN THAT HOUSE, IT WAS HARD TO HAVE 
5 MONEY LEFT. THERE WAS REALLY NOT MUCH MONEY. 
6 Q. SIR, IT'S YOUR POSITION HERE BEFORE THIS COURT, 
7 YOU FEEL THAT EVERYTHING SHOULD BE SOLD AND THE CASH 
8 GENERATED SHOULD BE USED TO SUPPORT MRS. HOWELL; DID I 
9 STATE THAT APPROPRIATELY? 
10 A. WOULD YOU REPEAT THAT, PLEASE. 
11 Q. YOU INDICATED YOU DID NOT WANT TO PAY ALIMONY, 
12 CORRECT? 
13 A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
14 Q. AND THE REASON FOR THAT WAS THAT IF THE ASSETS 
15 WERE SOLD, THAT WOULD GENERATE ENOUGH MONIES THAT WOULD 
16 REPLACE THE ALIMONY TO SUPPORT MRS. HOWELL; IS THAT 
17 CORRECT? 
18 A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
19 Q. YOU WOULD LIKEWISE RECEIVE THE SAME AMOUNT OF 
20 CASH FROM THE LIQUIDATION OF THOSE ASSETS; WOULD YOU NOT? 
21 A. IF THEY WERE DIVIDED EQUALLY. 
22 Q. THEN YOU WOULD ON TOP OF THAT HAVE YOUR SALARY? 
23 A. YES. 
24 Q. DO YOU THINK THAT'S FAIR, YOU TO HAVE YOUR 
25 SALARY PLUS HALF THE CASH FROM THE ASSETS, AND MRS. HOWELL 
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1 A. YES. MR. HOWELL WOULD RECEIVE THE TAX BENEFIT 
2 AS I'VE STATED, UNDER EITHER SCENARIO, 33 CENTS OF EVERY 
3 DOLLAR HE PAID IN ALIMONY WOULD BE A REDUCTION OF INCOME 
4 TAXES. 
5 Q. WHAT WOULD BE MRS. HOWELL'S BENEFIT? 
6 A. MRS. HOWELL WOULD RECEIVE THE INCOME AND IT 
7 WOULD BE SUBJECT TO INCOME TAX AT APPROXIMATELY 28%. 
8 Q. RATHER THAN 33 THAT MR. HOWELL PAYS? 
9 A. YES. 
10 Q. I TAKE IT IF THE ALIMONY WERE NOT PAID, HE 
11 WOULDN'T HAVE THAT TYPE OF DEDUCTION? 
12 A. CORRECT. 
13 Q. AND HE WOULD BE PAYING MORE IN FEDERAL TAXES? 
14 A. YES. 
15 Q. IS IT THEN FAIR TO ASSUME IF EITHER OF THESE 
16 APPROACHES WERE ADOPTED BY THE COURT, WHAT WOULD HAVE BEEN 
17 FEDERAL TAX DOLLARS WOULD AID AND ASSIST IN PAYMENT OF THE 
18 ALIMONY? 
19 A. YES, A PORTION OF IT. 
20 Q. SIR, WERE YOU ALSO ASKED TO EXAMINE THE 
21 PROBABILITY OF THE SALE OF THE CALIFORNIA HOME AND THE TAX 
22 CONSEQUENCES THAT WOULD HAVE? 
23 A. YES, I WAS. 
24 Q. WOULD YOU STATE, SIR, WHAT YOUR UNDERSTANDING 
25 OF THE CALIFORNIA HOME IS AT THE PRESENT TIME, AS TO 
fDijpn u p.JOJfPp CSP. 
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1 OCCUPANCY. 
2 A. THAT IT'S RENTED. 
3 Q. AND DO YOU KNOW HOW LONG IT'S BEEN RENTED? 
4 A. I WAS TOLD FOR APPROXIMATELY FIVE YEARS. 
5 Q. IF IT WERE FOUR YEARS, WOULD THAT MAKE ANY 
6 DIFFERENCE? 
7 A. NO. 
8 Q. SIR, CAN THE PARTIES AT THE PRESENT TIME — 
9 I'LL PUT IT THIS WAY: ASSUME, IF YOU WOULD, SIR, THAT 
10 NEITHER PARTY HAS LIVED IN THE HOME FOR FOUR YEARS, IT'S 
11 BEEN RENTED FOR FOUR YEARS AND THE PARTIES WOULD LIKE TO 
12 SELL THE HOME. DO THEY QUALIFY AT THIS TIME FOR THE 
13 CAPITAL FREE EXCLUSION UNDER THAT ASSUMPTION? 
14 A. THERE IS — 
15 MR. DOLOWITZ: YOUR HONOR, IF THIS IS COMING IN 
16 AS HIS OPINION, AS OPPOSED TO ABSOLUTE DEFINITE FACT, I 
17 HAVE NO OBJECTION. 
18 THE COURT: THIS IS HIS OPINION? 
19 MR. LIAPIS: YES, THAT'S WHY I SAID ASSUMPTION. 
20 THE WITNESS: SECTION 1034 OF THE INTERNAL 
21 REVENUE CODE ALLOWS A HOME OWNER TO ROLL OVER ANY GAIN THEY 
22 HAVE IN THEIR PRINCIPAL RESIDENCE, INTO A NEW HOME, AND NOT 
23 PAY INCOME TAX ON IT. ONE OF THE PROVISIONS OF THAT 
24 SECTION IS THAT THE GAIN ON THE OLD HOME THAT WAS SOLD, AND 
25 SUBSEQUENTLY ROLLED OVER INTO A NEW HOME, IS IT WAS THE 
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1 PRIMARY RESIDENCE. AND ACCORDING TO THE REGULATIONS, THE 
2 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE LOOKS AT THE FACTS AND 
3 CIRCUMSTANCES IN DETERMINING WHAT IS THE PRIMARY RESIDENCE. 
4 I DON'T THINK THAT IT'S POSSIBLE TO CONCLUDE 
5 AFFIRMATIVELY THAT THE CALIFORNIA HOME WOULD BE THEIR 
6 PRIMARY RESIDENCE UNLESS MR. AND MRS. HOWELL COULD PROVE 
7 THAT IT WAS ALWAYS THEIR INTENT TO RETURN TO CALIFORNIA AND 
8 TO LIVE IN THAT HOME AND THE MOVE TO SALT LAKE WAS 
9 TEMPORARY, AND A NUMBER OF THINGS IN LINE WITH THAT, THEN 
10 IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE THAT THAT COULD BE CONSIDERED A 
11 PRIMARY RESIDENCE. 
12 THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE MAY WELL TAKE THE 
13 POSITION IF THE RETURN WERE AUDITED, WHEN THE HOME WAS 
14 SOLD, THAT THAT WAS NOT THEIR PRIMARY RESIDENCE BECAUSE 
15 THEY MOVED TO SALT LAKE CITY BECAUSE THEY PURCHASED ANOTHER 
16 HOME HERE AND ABANDONED THAT AS THEIR PRIMARY RESIDENCE. 
17 SO I THINK IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO SAY THAT YOU COULD 
18 USE THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 1034 TO ROLL OVER ANY GAIN. 
19 Q, (BY MR. LIAPIS) WOULD THE FACT THEY RENTED IT 
20 HAVE ANY CONSEQUENCES, ASSUMING IF THEY HAD RENTED IT? 
21 A. IT WOULD IMPACT THAT DECISION. IT WOULDN'T BE 
22 CONCLUSIVE. I THINK UNDER THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES, IT 
23 WOULD BE ~ IT WOULD BE THE TAXPAYER'S BURDEN TO PROVE THAT 
24 WAS ALWAYS THEIR PRIMARY RESIDENCE, AND THAT THEY ALWAYS 
25 INTENDED TO MOVE BACK THERE AND THEY WERE FORCED TO MOVE TO 
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1 SALT LAKE FOR WORK-RELATED REASONS OR OTHER PERSONAL 
2 REASONS. THE BURDEN OF PROOF WOULD BE UPON THEM. 
3 Q. LET'S ASSUME ONE FURTHER THING. ASSUME THAT 
4 THE PARTIES WERE SEPARATED FOR TWO YEARS, WITH ONE SPOUSE 
5 LIVING IN ANOTHER STATE, OTHER THAN WHERE THE HOME STATE 
6 WAS LOCATED IN CALIFORNIA, WOULD THAT FURTHER COMPLICATE 
7 IT, IN YOUR OPINION? 
8 A. I THINK IT WOULD IN THAT IT WOULD GIVE 
9 AMMUNITION TO THE IRS TO SAY THERE WAS NEVER INTENT TO MOVE 
10 BACK TO THAT HOME AS A PRIMARY RESIDENCE BECAUSE OF THE 
11 MARITAL DIFFICULTIES. 
12 Q. REFERRING NOW TO THE AGE 55 EXCLUSION FROM ANY 
13 CAPITAL GAINS TAXES, DO YOU KNOW THE SECTION THAT IS 
14 INVOLVED WITH THAT? 
15 A. YES, I DO, INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 121. 
16 Q. WHAT DOES THAT REQUIRE BY WAY OF FACTS TO 
17 JUSTIFY, TO TAKE THE EXCLUSION OF CAPITAL GAINS? 
18 A. IT REQUIRES, IF I CAN READ FROM THE CODE 
19 SECTION, SECTION 121 A-l, REQUIRES THAT THE TAXPAYER HAS 
20 ATTAINED THE AGE OF 55 BEFORE THE DATE OF SUCH SALE OR 
21 EXCHANGE, AND CODE SECTION — INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 
22 121 A-2, DURING THE FIVE YEAR PERIOD ENDING ON THE DATE OF 
23 SALE OR EXCHANGE, SUCH PROPERTY HAS BEEN OWNED AND USED BY 
24 THE TAXPAYER AS HIS PRINCIPAL RESIDENCE FOR THE PERIODS 
25 AGGREGATING THREE YEARS OR MORE. 
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1 A. YES. I THINK IT SHOULD AT LEAST BE SOMETHING 
2 THAT SHOULD BE EXAMINED TO SEE IF THERE'S A TAX SAVINGS 
3 THAT MERIT FILING JOINT RETURNS. 
4 Q. MR. HOWELL'S '87 RETURN RESULTED IN A $2,500.00 
5 REFUND, HASN'T IT? 
6 A. YES, IT HAS. 
7 MR. LIAPIS: THANK YOU. 
8 THE COURT: MR. DOLOWITZ. 
9 
10 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
11 BY MR. DOLOWITZ: 
12 Q. MR. PAPANIKOLAS, 23 AND 24 WERE PREPARED BY 
13 YOU, YOU SAID BASED UPON THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE 
14 PRE-MERGER AGREEMENT, WHICH FOR COURT PURPOSES HAS BEEN 
15 MARKED AS EXHIBIT 22, CORRECT? 
16 A. YES. 
17 Q. IF THAT WERE IN THE PROCESS OF BEING 
18 RENEGOTIATED AND THE RATES TURNED OUT TO BE DIFFERENT THAN 
19 THOSE THAT ARE SPELLED OUT IN THAT, THAT WOULD IN EFFECT 
20 NEGATE THE CALCULATIONS SET OUT IN 23 AND 24? 
21 A. IT WOULD CHANGE WHATEVER AMOUNT THE INCOME 
22 CHANGES, THEN IT WOULD CHANGE THOSE CALCULATIONS, YES. 
23 Q. SO WHERE WAGES HAD BEEN CALCULATED IN ONE CASE 
24 AT 110,000, AND EXHIBIT 24 FOR 121, AND 131 IN EXHIBIT 23, 
25 IF EXHIBIT 22 IS RENEGOTIATED AND THERE'S A CHANGE, THOSE 
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1 Q. WHERE DID YOU GET $640.00 A MONTH? 
2 A. I WAS PROVIDED THAT BY MR. LIAPIS, WHAT SHE HAS 
3 EARNED, WHAT SHE HAS BEEN EARNING. 
4 Q. WHAT IF SHE WERE EARNING $1,400 A MONTH? 
5 A. THEN SHE WOULD HAVE A GREATER TAKE-HOME PAY AND 
6 IT WOULD CHANGE THE COMPUTATION. 
7 Q. OR EVEN A THOUSAND DOLLARS A MONTH? 
8 A. SAME THING. 
9 Q. YOU'VE ASSUMED SOME INCREASE IN HER EARNINGS. 
10 IT LOOKS LIKE $400 INCREASE. WHAT WAS THE BASIS FOR THAT 
11 INCREASE? 
12 A. JUST ASSUMING THAT MOST EMPLOYEES HAVE SOME 
13 INCREASE FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. 
14 Q. SO THAT IS JUST BASED UPON AN ASSUMPTION? 
15 A. YES, INFLATION ASSUMPTION. 
16 Q. NOW, YOU'VE ALSO INDICATED THAT THE SELL OF THE 
17 CALIFORNIA HOME WOULD NOT QUALIFY UNDER SECTION 1034. 
18 WOULD YOU AGREE THAT DIFFERENT TAX ADVISORS MIGHT COME TO 
19 DIFFERENT OPINIONS ON THAT QUESTION? 
20 A. I'VE STATED IT MAY NOT QUALIFY. I THINK THERE 
21 ARE VERY GOOD GROUNDS THAT IT MAY NOT QUALIFY, BUT IT IS 
22 NOT A CLEAR BLACK AND WHITE ISSUE. AND ANOTHER ADVISOR — 
23 I DON'T BELIEVE THAT ANOTHER ADVISOR WOULD GUARANTEE THAT 
24 IT WOULD PASS THE MUSTARD OF AN IRS REVIEW. 
25 Q. CAN YOU GUARANTEE IT WOULD NOT? 
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1 ASSUME IT WOULD FREE UP $260,000.00 IN CASH. 
2 A. OKAY. 
3 Q. IF THE PARTIES EACH HAVE $130,000, THEY WOULD 
4 HAVE TO PAY SOME TAXES ON THAT. WE ASSUME THERE'S A GAIN 
5 ON THE HOUSE. AND IF THEY'RE SUCCESSFUL IN THEIR ROLL 
6 OVER, THEN THEY DON'T HAVE TO PAY TAXES. BUT IF THEY ARE 
7 UNSUCCESSFUL, THEY PAY TAXES. ARE EACH OF THEM FREE THEN 
8 TO GO BUY A NEW HOUSE? 
9 A. YES, THEY ARE. 
10 Q. AND THEY WILL BE HOLDING 100 TO $130,000 IN 
11 CASH TO GO BUY THAT HOUSE? 
12 A. OKAY, IF THE PROCEEDS ARE SPLIT EQUALLY. 
13 Q. SO IF THEY OWN THAT HOUSE THEN FOR — YOU SAID 
14 THE PERIOD WAS FIVE YEARS FOR SECTION 121? 
15 A. YES. BUT THEY MUST OCCUPY IT FOR THREE TO FIVE 
16 YEARS. 
17 Q. BUT IF THEY THEN HAVE THAT MONEY AND WERE ABLE 
18 TO BUY A HOUSE AND IT GOES UP — LET'S ASSUME EITHER ONE — 
19 IN THE FIRST HYPOTHETICAL IT GOES UP IN VALUE, AND THEY'RE 
20 ABLE TO GET MORE THAN THE 130 OUT, WOULD THEY BE ABLE TO 
21 SHOULDER THAT UNDER 121? 
22 A. YES, THEY WOULD. 
23 Q. AND IF THEY ARE SUCCESSFUL IN DEFERRING A GAIN 
24 UNDER 1034, WOULD THEY THEN, IF THEY GO OUT AND BUY A NEW 
25 HOUSE, BE ABLE TO DEFER IT, ASSUMING THEY THEN MEET THE 
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1 REQUIREMENTS OF 121? 
2 A. YES, T"*- • >. 
3 MR. uuuuWITZ: *. iiAVL NO FURTHER QUESTIONS,, 
4 THE COURT: MR, TTAPIS. 
5 
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1 A. UNDER THE AGE OF 55? 
2 Q. YES. 
3 A. $125,000. 
4 Q. AND IF THE HOME WERE AWARDED TO MRS. HOWELL AND 
5 SUBSEQUENTLY SOLD, WOULD THERE BE TAXABLE CONSEQUENCE TO 
6 HER, EVEN IF SHE WERE 55? 
7 A. IF SHE WERE 55, BASED UPON THE ADJUSTED BASIS 
8 OF THE HOME WHICH SHOWS UP ON MR. HOWELL'S TAX RETURN, 
9 BECAUSE IT'S BEEN APPRECIATED, WHICH IS APPROXIMATELY 
10 $50,000, THERE WOULD BE INCOME SUBJECT TO INCOME TAX 
11 BEYOND THE $125,000. 
12 Q. HAVE YOU A CALCULATION, A PRESENT VALUE BASED 
13 UPON THAT TAX RETURN AND THE DEPRECIATION BASED UPON THE 
14 '87 TAX RETURN? 
15 A. I HAVE. 
16 Q. AND PRESENT VALUE — WHAT KIND OF PRESENT 
17 VALUE WOULD THAT TAX BE? 
18 A. I PROJECTED IF THE HOME WERE SOLD FOR 
19 $290,000.00 — 
20 MR. DOLOWITZ: OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR, 
21 SPECULATIVE. WE DON'T KNOW WHAT THE VALUE IS. WE HAVE AN 
22 APPRAISAL ON IT, BUT MR. LIAPIS OBJECTED TO THAT COMING IN. 
23 SO AT THIS POINT WE HAVE JUST MY CLIENT'S OPINION. IT'S 
24 NOT 290. THIS IS BASED TOTALLY ON SPECULATION. THERE ARE 
25 NO FACTS IN EVIDENCE UPON WHICH TO BASE THAT. 
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1 ASSUMING THAT THE HOME WAS SOLD IN FIVE YEARS, AND 
2 ASSUMING, USING AN 8 PERCENT DISCOUNT RATE. 
3 Q. SO THAT'S SOMETHING MR. HOWELL OR MRS. HOWELL, 
4 OR EITHER, WHOEVER WERE AWARDED THE HOME AND LIVE IN IT FOR 
5 FIVE YEARS, WOULD HAVE TO LOOK FORWARD TO AT THAT 
6 ASSUMPTION OF 260; IS THAT CORRECT? 
7 A. YES. 
8 MR. LIAPIS: THANK YOU. 
9 THE COURT: MR. DOLOWITZ. 
10 
11 RE-CROSS EXAMINATION 
12 BY MR. DOLOWITZ: 
13 Q. ONE QUESTION YOU WERE ASKED, YOU SAY PAYMENT OF 
14 ALIMONY IS A BENEFIT? IF YOU WERE ORDERED TO PAY ALIMONY 
15 WOULD YOU CONSIDER THAT A TAX BENEFIT TO YOU? 
16 A. WELL, A BENEFIT IN THAT FOR EVERY DOLLAR YOU 
17 PAY, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PAYS A PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF 
18 IT; IN THIS CASE 33 PERCENT. 
19 Q. BUT YOU WOULD BE PAYING 66 CENTS OF IT? 
20 A. CORRECT. 
21 Q. AND YOU WOULD NOT HAVE USE OF THAT 66 CENTS? 
22 A. CORRECT. 
23 Q. SOMEBODY ELSE WOULD? 
24 A. CORRECT. 
25 Q. WOULD YOU ADVISE A CLIENT TO WILLINGLY PAY 
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Ml-: . LI AIM N I IE 
W n o L O W T T Z : 
il-M IKS ION 
i A V E N ' T SEEN 
M, BW 
,„-• T H A T ? 
-"" i MR. DOLOWITZ, : I IIAVl' NH I I (BJ E« T I UN I " Ill' 
, '1 HONOR. 
J ::> THE COURT : I T Vi l ii-l E H hi E I V E1) 
"I I' "O A T"> V I? t ) P Q D 
1 A. YES. 
2 Q. WELL — I'M SORRY, YOUR PROPOSAL IS $3,500 
3 ALIMONY AND $500 CHILD SUPPORT? 
4 A. I DON'T HAVE THAT. 
5 Q. I'LL SHOW YOU MY COPY OF 18 AND DIRECT YOUR 
6 ATTENTION TO PARAGRAPHS THREE AND FOUR? 
7 A. YES. THIS IS WHAT WE DISCUSSED. 
8 Q. WITH THE 4,000 PLUS YOUR SALARY, WOULD YOU BE 
9 ABLE TO MEET YOUR MONTHLY NEEDS AND OBLIGATIONS? 
10 A. YES. 
11 Q. ARE YOU GOING TO HAVE A JOB AS OF JANUARY 3RD? 
12 A. NOT AT CASUAL FURNITURE. 
13 Q. WHY? 
14 A. THEY'RE GOING OUT OF BUSINESS. 
15 Q. AND IS THAT DECISION THEY MADE FORCING YOUR 
16 TERMINATION? 
17 A. YES. 
18 Q. I SHOW YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED EXHIBIT 26, MRS. 
19 HOWELL. CAN YOU IDENTIFY THAT? 
20 A. YES. THESE ARE THE AVERAGE MONTHLY LIVING 
21 EXPENSES. 
22 Q. AND IF I WERE TO GO DOWN EACH OF THE CATEGORIES 
23 AND THE AMOUNTS, WOULD YOUR TESTIMONY BE THE SAME AS 
24 APPEARS ON THE DOCUMENT? 
25 A. YES, THESE ARE AVERAGES. 
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Q. AND THOSE DESIGNATED WITH A "W", ARE THOSE THE 
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3 SUPPOR I" WE* RE ASKING?1 
4 A. YES, 
5 Q. 
7 A. 
8 EXHIBIT, 
THOSE HAPPENS TO BE THE CALIFORNIA H< DME, 
,JLL, ITfS MARKED WITH THE "HUSBAND" OVER THE 
9 Q. I'lIA I"  SHOULD BE MARKED WITH A "W '; IS H1A' I" 
10 CORRECT? 
A. YES. 
12 Q. WHY IS IT THAT YOO WANT THE CALIFORNIA POME, 
13 ' ? 
A. WELI 7'" CALIFORNIA HOMF H*.0 WAS OUR HOME 
1 6 Y E A R S -V- •< '• * l E F O R h M O V I N G 
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1.8 GROWING IIP AND ALL THAT 
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I N I I N I I ' N I ' i|i' l , i "Ml T I Ml I " 1 Mi )VE 
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WHY HAV!--. *,0». : f I- ML i«!H 1 HF 
A. 
Q. 
WF? 
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1 DISMISSAL AND FILING AGAIN PRECIPITATED A PROBLEM WITH YOU 
2 RETURNING TO CALIFORNIA? 
3 A. YES, THEY HAVE. THERE WAS NO WAY TO REALLY 
4 MAKE PLANS, AND THE FACT THAT THE INCOME GENERATED FROM THE 
5 RENTAL DOWN THERE HELPED KEEP THINGS AFLOAT HERE. 
6 Q. IF THE COURT WERE TO AWARD YOU THE HOUSE, WHEN 
7 WOULD YOU MOVE, IF YOU COULD? 
8 A. AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THERE'S A SCHOOL BREAK 
9 THE END OF JANUARY. IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE TO MOVE SHAUN AT 
10 THAT TIME. 
11 Q. WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO GO ALONG WITH MR. 
12 HOWELL'S PROPOSAL YOU SELL THE HOUSE? 
13 A. IN CALIFORNIA? 
14 Q. YES. 
15 A. NO, I DON'T WANT TO DO THAT. 
16 Q. WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO TAKE THE CHANCES WITH 
17 REGARDS TO WHETHER OR NOT YOU COULD ROLL THAT HOUSE OVER IN 
18 THE WAYS THAT WERE DISCUSSED BY MR. PAPANIKOLAS? 
19 A. YES. 
20 Q. I'M SORRY. DID YOU UNDERSTAND MY QUESTION? 
21 A. WELL, YOU'RE ASKING IF I WANT POSSESSION OF THE 
22 CALIFORNIA HOME? 
23 Q. OH, NO. I'M SORRY. MR. DOLOWITZ WAS ASKING 
24 MR. PAPANIKOLAS IF — THERE WAS A QUESTION WHETHER YOU 
25 COULD ROLL OVER THE SALE PROCEEDS OF THAT HOUSE AND AVOID 
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1 TAXES;- DO YOU • R EC ALL THAT? -•• • 
2 A. YES, I DC . 
3 Q # A N D WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO TAKE THAT CHANCE 
4 ' AND TRY TO ROLL OVER THOSE PROCEEDS AND AVOTD A TAX AT THIS 
5 TIME? 
6 A. NO " ^ MT^'N SPLITTING IT RIGHT NOW? NO, THAT 
7 SOUNDED LIKE A V C K . • . RISK IX) ME 
8 Q. MR. HOWELL HAS ALSO PROPOSED NO ALIMONY TO YOU; 
9 I S "THAT CORRECT1 
1 0 A . n i H K K C T , 
1 1 Q . VNI 
12 ASSETS, YOU ((HI - r 'Mi::-h f SI * PORT V3URSBL; *OTL$ 
1 3 • G ( i \ i . i I N I a il mi in il ill mi . • 
1 4 A . N O . 
1 5 II-illIII mi 
1 6 I'll 1 I I T H I N K i ' V K P U T A P R E T T Y B I H I N V E S T M E N T 
1 7 III J il'i T I M S MAHiniA'LJE M i S M . I 1 . Wl ' ', I Hi iNI I HROUGH A l .u ' l n l 
1 8 Y E A R S T O G E T H E R , A LOT OK T I M E . AND THAI" WAS AN I N V E S T M E N T 
1 9 0 1 1 I I i II'". \\i Il AI S!1 , \1 Ill I HhMll i jH I HI' I N M I ' A L ' xlJh L " "l" h!i V 1 IMU ". 
20 ON UP THROUGH HIS AIRLINE CAREER, .1 K»- i I I M < I H< •— -.ERE 
21 JOIN I" 1NVUS i""MI iNTS I'H/ V'l I U>1 W K R K M A K I N O .  A. • 
22 BELIEVE IN COMMITMENTS, AND I BELIEVED THAT WE WERE 
23 COMMITTED TO THE SAME PURPOSE FOR A LONG TIME. 
24 ^.
 ±oU HEARD HIM INDICATE ABOUT THE SUFFERINGS OF 
25 THE W ^ ^ R N AIRLINES SALARY AND SO FORTH, WAS THAT 
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1 ACCURATE?. 
2 A. YES. 
3 Q. DID THAT CAUSE FINANCIAL BURDENS? 
4 A. THINGS WERE TIGHT, AND WE WERE ALSO RUNNING A 
5 BUSINESS AT THAT TIME TO HELP SUPPLEMENT, WHICH TOOK EVEN 
6 MORE OF HIS TIME, YES. 
7 Q. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE ALIMONY SHOULD BE BASED 
8 UPON HIS CURRENT INCOME? 
9 A. YES, I DO. 
10 Q. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT YOUR LIVING EXPENSES OVER 
11 THE YEARS HAVE BEEN MEAGER IN THE SENSE OF THE '85, '86 
12 PERIOD WHEN HE WAS SUFFERING FROM THE WAGE DEDUCTION? 
13 A. YES. THERE WERE TIMES WHEN IT WAS TIGHT, YES. 
14 Q. WE HAVE INTRODUCED EXHIBIT 18 ALREADY, WHICH 
15 WAS YOUR ITEMIZATION OF THE ASSETS, VALUES AND PROPOSED 
16 DISTRIBUTION, CORRECT? 
17 A. YES. I HAVE A COPY OF THAT. 
18 Q. THERE'S BEEN SOME TESTIMONY THAT THERE'S BEEN 
19 TWO OFFERS TO BUY ON THE HOME? 
20 A. ABOUT THE UTAH HOME? 
21 Q. YES. 
22 A. YES. 
23 Q. HOW MUCH WERE THOSE OFFERS? 
24 A. 140,000. 
25 Q. WHY, TO YOUR INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE, WOULD 
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1 /.AVE TO 3E 'HOME? 
2 A. 
3
 A11 THE AFTERNOON.' 
4 n i'HFRL A N Y Nil Mi i I HA I JM'dl-i' Hill MiiiN .K'UI-'INiJ 
6 A T HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO FIND ONE 
7 .LOU HAVE BEEN SEPARATED FROM MR- HOWELL, IN 
8 ESSENCE, FOR ™ T ir YEARS? 
9 UILII. 
10 "I t^V BEEN WORKING FOR FOUR YEARS AT THAT 
1 
1 2 - • Am 
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14 GET ' JOB? 
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16 AN EVALUATION, 
17 
13 CLAIMING LIVING EXPENSES OP $5,0 013 A M<*NT» ><y% 
19 B 
20 -:<fc A' -'HE PRESENT TIME. 
21 
22 LESS FXPENSIV* '«' ^XPFNSF * UM« DROP' 
23 0 
24 TIME. I T'S MORE EXPENSIVE TO ^IVE IN -'M.-IFORNIA AI SO. 
25.' Q, YOU'VE INDICATED FOOD WO HOUSEHHLu SUPI M ,JI''J-
1 A. WHAT AR-E YOU REFERRING TC, WHICH- 3HEET? 
2 Q. I'M LOOKING AT EXHIBIT 26-D, "DEFENDANTS 
3 AVERAGE MONTHLY LIVING EXPENSES". YOU SAY YOU WERE 
4 SPENDING $5,021.00 A MONTH? 
5 A. ALL OF THESE FIGURES THAT YOU SEE HERE ARE 
6 REPRESENTATIVE OF AVERAGES FROM CHECKS THAT I HAVE WRITTEN. 
7 THESE ARE ACCURATE FIGURES. 
8 Q. COULD YOU EXPLAIN TO ME WHERE THE ADDITIONAL 
9 $2,000 A MONTH IS COMING FROM? 
10 A. I TOLD YOU EARLIER I HAD BORROWED MONEY ON A 
11 COUPLE OF OCCASIONS. I'VE ALSO HAD SOME GIVEN TO ME. 
12 Q. WHOSE BEEN GIVING YOU MONEY? 
13 A. WELL, JUST A GIFT FROM FAMILY OR FRIENDS. 
14 Q. WHO? WHO IN SPECIFIC HAS GIVEN YOU GIFTS AND 
15 WHAT AMOUNTS AND WHEN? 
16 A. I DON'T HAVE A RECORD OF THAT. 
17 Q. WHEN WAS THE LAST GIFT OF MONEY YOU RECEIVED? 
18 A. I RECEIVED A $200 CHRISTMAS GIFT. DO YOU WANT 
19 TO KNOW ABOUT MY CHRISTMAS GIFTS? 
20 Q. FROM WHOM? 
21 A. MY BROTHER. 
22 Q. WHEN WAS THE GIFT BEFORE THAT? 
23 A. I DON'T RECALL. 
24 Q. BUT SOMEHOW OR ANOTHER IT TOTALS $2,000 A 
25 MONTH. NOW YOU SAID YOU BORROWED MONEY. THERE'S A LOAN ON 
r-DCi?n u B A O K P D P<5R 
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i HERE" FROM TRACY COLLINS-, 300 -- I'M LOOKING AT EXHIBIT 21. 
2 WHEN DID YOU TAKE OUT A LOAN AT TRACY COLLINS FOR $353.00 
3 OR IS THAT THE PRESENT BALANCE? 
4 A. THOSE- FIGURES SHOULD BE REVERSED. TRACY 
5 COLLINS BANK IS THE bOI. CAMARILLO COMMUNITY BANK IS 353. 
6 Q. WHEN DID YOU TAKE OUT THE LOAN? 
7 A. SEPTEMBER. 
8 Q. OF THIS YEAR? 
9 A. YES, OR AUGUST. I CAN'T REMEMBER. I THINK MY 
10 FIRST PAYMENT WAS SEPTEMBER. 
11 Q. THAT WAS TRACY COLLINS? 
12 A. RIGHT. 
13 Q. AT THE TIME YOU TOOK IT OUT WITH TRACY COLLINS, 
14 WHAT WAS THE PURPOSE OF THE LOAN? 
15 A. TO CONSOLIDATE DEBTS. 
16 Q. DID YOU PUT UP ANY SECURITY FOR THE LOAN? 
17 A. NO. 
18 Q. CAMARILLO COMMUNITY BANK, WHEN WAS THAT LOAN 
19 INCURRED? 
20 A. THAT WAS ABOUT 13, 14 MONTHS AGO. 
21 Q. WAS ANY SECURITY POSTED ON THAT? 
22 A. NO. 
23 Q. WHAT WAS THE PURPOSE OF THAT LOAN? 
24 A. TO PAY DEBTS. 
25 Q. THESE ARE SIGNED FOR SOLELY BY YOU? 
2. 
1 A. THE CAMAR1LL0 ONE IS. 
2 Q. TRACY COLLINS IS SIGNED BY YOU SOLELY? 
3 A. NO. 
4' Q. WHO SIGNED ON IT WITH YOU? 
5 A. MARILYN HAIRS. 
6 Q. THAT'S NOT MR. HOWELL? 
7 A. NO. 
8 Q. YOU HAVE HERE A PERSONAL LOAN FOR ATTORNEY'S 
9 FEES, $1,500.00? 
10 A. YES. 
11 Q. FROM WHOM IS THAT LOAN TAKEN? 
12 A. THAT'S A VERY PERSONAL MATTER. IT INVOLVES A 
13 PROBLEM WITHIN THE FAMILY. I THINK IT WOULD CREATE A 
14 PROBLEM TO ANSWER THAT. I'D RATHER KEEP IT PRIVATE. I 
15 THINK IT WILL CAUSE STRIFE. 
16 Q. THEN THAT REALLY WASN'T BORROWED, WAS IT? 
17 A. PARDON? 
18 Q. THAT MONEY WASN'T BORROWED? 
19 A. I WOULD LIKE TO REPAY IT. 
20 Q. YOU WOULD LIKE TO. SO YOU HAVE NOT REPAID? 
21 A. I HAVE NOT. 
22 Q. WHEN YOU PUT DOWN $100 A MONTH, THAT IN FACT I 
23 NOT BEING PAID? 
24 A. NOT AT THIS POINT. THAT IS WHAT I NEED TO DO. 
25 Q. THERE IS A VISA FOR CAMARILLO BANK. IS THAT 
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1 YOUR OWN VISA.' 
2 A. YES. 
3 Q. YOU'VE TAKEN OUT AND MAINTAINED IT BY YOURSELF? 
4 A. YES. 
5 Q. NORDSTROMS IS SOLELY YOUR DEBT? 
6 A. YES. 
7 Q. WINESTOCKS IS SOLELY YOUR DEBT? 
8 A. YES. 
9 Q. ZCMI IS SOLELY YOUR DEBT? 
10 A. YES. 
11 Q. THOSE HAVE ALL BEEN INCURRED BY YOU SINCE THIS 
12 ACTION HAS BEEN PENDING? 
13 A. NO. 
14 Q. WHICH ONES HAVE NOT BEEN INCURRED DURING THE 
15 PENDENCY OF THIS ACTION? 
16 A. THE VISA, ALL FOUR ARE ON-GOING ACCOUNTS. 
17 Q. THEN YOU HAVE NOT PAID — WERE THE SAME AMOUNTS 
18 DUE AT THE TIME THIS ACTION WAS FILED? 
19 A. VERY CLOSE. 
20 Q. WOULD YOU HAVE PAID THEM OFF IF YOU HAD NOT 
21 INCURRED ADDITIONAL CHARGES DURING THIS YEAR? 
22 A. POSSIBLY. 
23 Q. LOOKING AT THE DEBTS YOU'VE INDICATED ARE FOR 
24 YOUR HUSBAND, IF THE CALIFORNIA HOME IS SOLD THE 
25 WEYERHAUSER MORTGAGE AND PACIFIC SOLDIER (SIC) LOAN WOULD 
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1 MR. DOLOWITZ: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
2 MR. LIAPIS: I HAVE NO FURTHER QUESTIONS, YOUR 
3 HONOR. 
4 THE COURT: YOU MAY STEP DOWN MISS HOWELL. 
5 THANK YOU. ANYTHING FURTHER, MR. LIAPIS? 
6 MR. LIAPIS: JUST A PROFFER ON THE ATTORNEY'S 
7 FEES, YOUR HONOR. I MAY DO THAT FROM HERE, IS THAT ALL 
8 RIGHT, COUNSEL? 
9 MR. DOLOWITZ: IT'S ACCEPTABLE TO ME IF IT'S 
10 ACCEPTABLE TO THE COURT. 
11 THE COURT: FINE, JUST SO YOU CAN BE HEARD. 
12 MR. LIAPIS: FOR PURPOSES OF THIS ACTION, YOUR 
13 HONOR, IT WOULD BE OUR PROFFER THAT MRS. HOWELL RETAINED US 
14 ON THE 2ND OF NOVEMBER, 1987. IT WOULD BE AFTER THE 
15 DISMISSAL OF THE FIRST ACTION. SINCE THAT, SHE EMPLOYED US 
16 AT THE RATE OF $125.00 PER HOUR. I THINK THAT'S REASONABLE 
17 WITHIN THE CONFINES OF THIS COMMUNITY, THE TYPE OF ACTION 
18 PERFORMED AND PREPARATION IN THIS MATTER. TO DATE, I'VE 
19 INCURRED IN THIS MATTER SOME 75.2 HOURS. AND THAT DOES NOT 
20 INCLUDE THE TIME TODAY, WHICH IS GOING TO APPROACH AT LEAST 
21 EIGHT HOURS AT $125.00. I THINK THE CALCULATION CAME OUT 
22 TO $9,437.50. THAT IS WITHOUT THE EIGHT HOURS FOR TODAY. 
23 AND I ASSUME IF THE COURT ASKS US FOR THE PAPERWORK IT 
24 MIGHT TAKE ANOTHER TWO, THREE HOURS ON TOP OF THAT. THAT'S 
25 THE BASIS FOR THE REQUEST IN EXHIBIT 18 FOR THE ATTORNEYS 
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1 TO THE PLAINTIFF UPON THE COMPLAINT, AND ALSO TO THE 
2 DEFENDANT ON HER COUNTERCLAIM. 
3 THE COURT FINDS THE DEFENDANT TO BE A FIT AND 
4 PROPER PERSON TO BE AWARDED THE CARE AND CUSTODY OF THE 
5 MINOR CHILD, SHAUN DANIEL HOWELL, AND FINDS IT WOULD BE IN 
6 THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD IF THE DEFENDANT WERE 
7 AWARDED CUSTODY OF THAT CHILD; THEREFORE AWARDS CUSTODY OF 
8 THE MINOR CHILD TO THE DEFENDANT, WITH RIGHTS OF REASONABLE 
9 VISITATION TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
10 THE COURT IS GOING TO APPLY THESE GUIDELINES 
11 WITH REGARD TO CHILD SUPPORT AND WILL ORDER THE PLAINTIFF 
12 TO PAY THE DEFENDANT CHILD SUPPORT IN THE AMOUNT OF 
13 $1,363.00, UNTIL SHAUN REACHES THE AGE OF 18, AND/OR UNTIL 
14 HIS NORMAL GRADUATING CLASS GRADUATES FROM HIGH SCHOOL. 
15 THE COURT IS GOING TO ALLOW THE INCOME TAX EXEMPTION FOR 
16 THE CHILD TO GO TO THE CUSTODIAL PARENT, THE DEFENDANT IN 
17 THIS CASE. 
18 WITH REGARD TO ALIMONY, THE COURT HAS ATTEMPTED 
19 TO APPLY THE LAW OF THE STATE OF UTAH, AND THAT IS TO 
20 EQUALIZE THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF THE PARTIES, AND TO 
21 MAINTAIN THAT STANDARD AT A LEVEL AT WHICH IT EXISTED 
22 DURING THE MARRIAGE. THE COURT IS OF THE OPINION THAT THAT 
23 LEVEL OF STANDARD OF LIVING EXPERIENCED BY THE PARTIES 
24 DURING THE MARRIAGE, IS BEST REPRESENTED BY THE STANDARD OF 
25 LIVING THAT THEY ENJOYED AT THE TIME OF THE SEPARATION OF 
24b 
1 THE PARTIES DURING THE 1986 PERIOD OF TiME. 
2 AT THAT TIME THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS MATTER WAS 
3 EARNING APPROXIMATELY 55, TO $5,600.00 PER MONTH. THE 
4 COURT FINDS THAT THE DEFENDANT DOES HAVE A NEED FOR AN 
5 AWARD OF ALIMONY; THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAS THE ABILITY TO PAY 
6 ALIMONY. AND IN DETERMINING HIS ABILITY TO PAY AND HELP 
7 MAINTAIN HER STANDARD OF LIVING, THE COURT FINDS HIS 
8 PRESENT INCOME TO BE $10,000 A MONTH, GROSS. 
9 THE COURT HAS ALSO TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE 
10 ABILITY OF THE DEFENDANT TO EARN AN INCOME IN THE AMOUNT OF 
11 APPROXIMATELY $7,500.00 A YEAR. AND IN CONSIDERING ALL OF 
12 THESE MATTERS, THE COURT MAKES AN ALIMONY AWARD OF $1,800 A 
13 MONTH, TO BE PAID TO THE DEFENDANT BY THE PLAINTIFF, HALF 
14 ON THE FIRST AND HALF ON THE 15TH, UNTIL THE DEFENDANT 
15 EITHER REMARRIES, COHABITATES, OR UNTIL FURTHER ORDER OF 
16 THIS COURT. 
17 WITH REGARD TO THE RETIREMENT PLANS, THE COURT 
18 WILL REQUIRE THAT THOSE PLANS BE DIVIDED EQUALLY BY A 
19 QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF 
20 THE MILITARY ACCOUNT PLAN, AND THAT THAT BE DIVIDED UNDER 
21 THE WOODWARD FORMULA. 
22 THE IRA'S WOULD BE AWARDED AS FOLLOWS: MERRILL 
23 LYNCH IRA IN THE WIFE'S NAME, I BELIEVE NUMBER 59681578, 
24 WOULD BE AWARDED TO THE WIFE, AND THE OTHER MERRILL LYNCH 
25 AND THE WESTERN FEDERAL CREDIT UNION IRA WOULD BE AWARDED 
1 CALIFORNIA VISA. 
2 THE COURT IS GOING TO ORDER THE PLAINTIFF PAY 
3 TO THE DEFENDANT ATTORNEYS FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF $7,500.00. 
4 NOW IS THERE ANYTHING THAT THE COURT HAS 
5 OVERLOOKED? 
6 MR. DOLOWITZ: I HAD A QUESTION, YOUR HONOR. 
7 YOU SAID THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS TO PAY THE MORTGAGE ON THE 
8 HOME IN UTAH. THAT'S BEING LIVED IN BY THE DEFENDANT. 
9 THE COURT: I'M GOING TO REQUIRE THAT HE PAY 
10 THAT UP UNTIL MAY 1. IF THE HOME IS NOT SOLD BY THAT TIME, 
11 AND THE DEFENDANT CONTINUES TO LIVE IN THE HOME, SHE WILL 
12 BE REQUIRED TO PAY THE PAYMENT. 
13 MR. DOLOWITZ: THAT'S ASSUMING JANUARY HASN'T 
14 BEEN PAID, UP TO MAY. 
15 THE COURT: I WILL INCLUDE THAT. 
16 MR. LIAPIS: I HAVE SOME QUESTIONS, TOO, YOUR 
17 HONOR. YOU WERE GOING AWFULLY FAST. YOU SAID ON THE LOTS 
18 IN TEXAS, ONE WOULD BE SOLD AND THE PROCEEDS DIVIDED. THEN 
19 I DIDN'T CATCH — 
20 THE COURT: THEN THE SIX LOTS COULD BE DIVIDED 
21 EQUALLY AMONG THE PARTIES; THREE LOTS TO GO TO EACH PARTY. 
22 THE COURT FINDS THEM ALL TO BE OF APPROXIMATE EQUAL VALUE 
23 AND HAVE A TOTAL VALUE OF 18,000. 
24 MR. LIAPIS: WITH REGARDS TO THE SELL OF THE 
25 CALIFORNIA HOME, IS THERE SOMEONE WHOSE GOING TO BE IN 
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